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For over 100 years, the best interest of the child was the "polar
star" that guided North Carolina courts in third-party custody
proceedings. Between 1883 and 1994, the courts consistently
recognized that the welfare of the child was the most important
consideration in disputes between a biological parent and a third
party-superior even to the parent's right to custody. The North
Carolina General Assembly affirmed this principle in 1967,
codifying the best interest standard for all custody proceedings. In
1994, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court repudiated
both precedent and statute, holding in Petersen v. Rogers that the
biological parent's right to custody is paramount and that courts
cannot consider the child's interest unless it is shown that the
biological parent is unfit or has abused or neglected the child.
Lower courts have since struggled to limit the application of
Petersen. In 1997, the supreme court modified its rule, holding
that courts may consider the child's best interest if there is
evidence of parental conduct that conflicts with the presumption
that the parent will act in the child's interest. Although the
holding of the supreme court in Price v. Howard mitigates the
effect of Petersen, it does not answer many questions raised by the
Petersen decision. In this article, Mr. Fowler and Ms. Nelson
analyze Petersen and its progeny, identify strategies for third-
party custody proceedings in light of the current state of the law,
and appeal for a return to the best interest standard for resolution
of third-party custody disputes.
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In North Carolina the best interest of the child is said to be
the "polar star" ....
If the interest of the child and parent are in conflict, the
child's interest controls.'
[P]laintiffs argue that "North Carolina recognizes the right
of a minor child to be placed in the custody of the person or
entity which will meet that child's best interests" .... [and
that] "the welfare of the child is paramount to all common
law preferential rights of the parents" .... [W]e explicitly
reject these arguments.2
The circumstances of the case sub judice are compelling.
Plaintiff has served as de facto father and ... as primary
caretaker ... of the minor child since her birth
approximately nine years prior to trial .... Indeed, the trial
court in its order ... concluded ... "[t]hat it is in the minor
child's best interest that she be in the primary physical
custody of the Plaintiff, but that the ruling in Peterson [sic]
v. Rogers does not allow this Court to make that award."
Like the trial court.... I am constrained to agree we are
bound by Petersen.3
I. INTRODUCrION
For more than 100 years, the welfare of the child has been the
polar star that has guided North Carolina courts in resolving custody
disputes. This approach has both allowed and compelled trial courts
to consider evidence of the child's interest and welfare when
resolving custody disputes between a biological parent and a third
party. Although it had not adopted a pure best interest test,4 the
1. CHILDREN AND THE LAW: A CASEBOOK FOR PRAcTICE 3 (Ilene B. Nelson ed.,
1992) (citations omitted).
2. Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 403, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905 (1994) (quoting the
plaintiff's arguments).
3. Price v. Howard, 122 N.C. App. 674, 676-77, 471 S.E.2d 673, 674-75 (1996) (John,
J., concurring) (quoting the trial court's findings of fact), rev'd, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d
528 (1997).
4. A true best interest test focuses solely on the interest of the child with no party
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presumed superior and no party bearing the burden of proof. The Hawaii Legislature has
codified the best interest standard. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (1992). The statute
provides:
Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother whenever
such award serves the best interest of the child. Any person who has had de
facto custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper
person shall be entitled prima facie to an award of custody.
Id. An example of a case where the best interest test allowed the courts to exercise broad
discretion is Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966). In Painter, the Supreme
Court of Iowa awarded custody to the maternal grandparents, who were college graduates
and highly-regarded in the community, instead of the fit natural father who had never
graduated from college, was "either an agnostic or atheist," and who had a "Bohemian
approach to finances and life in general." Id. at 154, 155. A true best interest test
maximizes the discretion of the trial judge. For a discussion of the use of discretion by the
trial judge, see generally Janet Leach Richards, The Natural Parent Preference Versus
Third Parties: Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 NOVA L. REV. 733, 758-60 (1992).
The author comments that "[t]he best interest approach lacks the advantages of judicial
economy, predictability, and consistency that result from the use of a presumption." Id.
at 760.
Judge (later United States Supreme Court Justice) Benjamin N. Cardozo first
pronounced the best interest of the child standard in Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624 (N.Y.
1925). Judge Cardozo stated that in exercising the parens patriae power, a judge should
"put himself in the position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent'" and "do what is
best for the interest of the child." Id. at 626 (quoting Queen v. Gyngall, 2 Q.B. 232, 241
(1893)). By enunciating the best interest standard, Judge Cardozo was neither expanding
the authority of 'judges to interfere in family matters nor altering the existing rules
governing who receives custody. The best interest standard was to be applied only in
situations when a judge had equitable jurisdiction to decide custody as between spouses
(when no divorce action was pending). See id. It was intended as a guide for the judge's
exercise of discretion when the judge already had the authority to exercise discretion, and
was not meant to undermine the tradition of judicial non-interference in custody matters.
See id.
As the twentieth century progressed, most states, either in statutes or in case law,
adopted language in some form indicating that the best interest of the child was the polar
star or the paramount consideration of the courts in resolving legal disputes that involved
the care or custody of a child. See Jay Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY
AND SHARED PARENTING 4 (Jay Folberg ed., 1984). As gender-neutral standards
supplanted both the common law preference for fathers and the tender years doctrine
preference for mothers, the best interest standard became the accepted method for
resolving custody disputes between divorcing spouses. But most state courts have never
clearly worked out how the best interest standard should apply to custody disputes
between natural parents and third parties. See generally Henry H. Foster, Jr., Adoption
and Child Custody: Best Interests ofthe Child, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4-14 (1972) (describing
several highly publicized child custody cases in Florida, Iowa, and New York and
contrasting the various standards applied by those states); Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence
M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third
Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 234-44 (1978) (describing confusion in the
Georgia courts regarding child custody standards); Michael B. Thompson, Child-Custody
Disputes Between Parents and Non-Parents: A Plea for the Abrogation of the Parental-
Right Doctrine in South Dakota, 34 S.D. L. REV. 534, 536-61 (1989) (describing the
development of the parens patriae doctrine in South Dakota); Kirsten Korn, Comment,
The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption Disputes Between
Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1291-1316 (1994) (discussing
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North Carolina Supreme Court retained a strong preference for
biological parent custody. The court's custody jurisprudence from
1883 until 1994 acknowledged that the child's welfare and needs-
and not the biological parent's right to custody-were paramount. In
1967, the General Assembly appeared to confirm that precedent by
adopting statutes setting out a pure best interest test to be applied in
all custody disputes;5 courts, however, continued to apply a
presumption in favor of biological parents.6
United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the definition of family and the limits
of constitutional protection for families).
The discretionary nature of the best interest test has bothered many appellate judges.
In the Baby Jessica case, the Iowa Supreme Court found it "tempting ... to resolve this
highly emotional issue with one's heart," but concluded that "we do not have the
unbridled discretion of a Solomon." In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992). If
there are no "established procedures," the court stated, courts would be " 'engaged in
uncontrolled social engineering.'" Id (quoting the district court). The court concluded
that judges may not" 'take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers
more advantages.'" Id. (quoting In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322,324 (Iowa 1977)).
5. See Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1153, § 2, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1772, 1772 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.1 & 50.13.2(a) (1995 & Supp. 1997)).
6. Despite near universal judicial testimonials to the child's welfare and best
interest, most states do not apply a pure best interest standard to resolve custody disputes
between biological parents and third parties. Instead, most states follow the traditional
parental rights doctrine. In general, this doctrine permits an award of custody to a
nonparent only if the parent is shown to be unfit or to have abandoned the child or to
have relinquished custody voluntarily. See, e.g., Larson v. Larson, 384 S.E.2d 193, 194
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (" '[T]he parent is entitled to custody of the child unless the third
party shows by "clear and convincing evidence" that the parent is unfit or otherwise not
entitled to custody in an action by a third party to obtain custody.'" (quoting Blackburn
v. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 825 (Ga. 1982) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 74-108));
Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611, 613 (Idaho 1989) ("In custody disputes between a
'nonparent' ... and a natural parent, Idaho courts apply a presumption that a natural
parent should have custody .... This presumption operates to preclude consideration of
the best interest of the child unless the nonparent demonstrates either that the natural
parent has abandoned the child... [or] is unfit."). In most cases, the nonparent bears the
burden of demonstrating factors such as the natural parent's unfitness or abandonment,
and the best interest analysis does not apply unless and until unfitness or abandonment
has been established. See, e.g., Michael G.B. v. Angela L.B., 642 N.Y.S.2d 452,454 (App.
Div. 1996).
Some states have adopted language requiring the existence of "extraordinary
circumstances" that justify interference with the biological parent's right to custody. For
example, the Illinois Supreme Court stated in In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995),
that
the superior right of natural parents to the care, custody and control of their
child is the law of the land and is also embodied in Illinois statutory law....
Unless a parent consents or is adjudged unfit, a child may not be placed in the
custody of a nonparent.... A nonparent may only assert standing under [this
section of law] if the natural parent at issue does not have physical custody of his
or her child.
Id. at 334-35. In addition, New York courts have noted that
[a]lthough no parent has an absolute right to custody of a child ... , it is settled
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Things changed in 1994, however, when a particularly difficult
custody dispute, reminiscent of the highly publicized Baby Jessica
case,7 found its way back to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The
law that, as between a biological parent (parent) and a nonbiological parent
(nonparent), the parent has a superior right to custody that cannot be denied
unless the nonparent can establish that the parent has relinquished that right
because of "surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like
extraordinary circumstances."
Michael G.B., 642 N.Y.S.2d at 454 (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277,280 (N.Y.
1976)). In Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076 (Md. 1994), the court stated:
"Where parents claim the custody of a child, there is a prima facie presumption
that the child's welfare will be best subserved in the care and custody of its
parents rather than in the custody of others, and the burden is then cast upon the
parties opposing them to show the contrary.... [I]t is only upon a
determination by the equity court that the parent is unfit or that there are
exceptional circumstances which make custody in the parent detrimental to the
best interest of the child, that the court need inquire into the best interest of the
child in order to make a proper custodial disposition."
Id. at 1084-85 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ross v. Hoffman, 372 A.2d 582, 586-87 (Md.
1977) and Ross v. Pick, 86 A.2d 463,478 (Md. 1952)).
The case law often blurs the distinction between parental rights and interest of the
child by observing that the best interest of the child is best served by granting custody to a
fit natural parent. See Suzette M. Haynie, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose
Right to Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705, 709 (1986).
Indeed, it is not always easy to tell which test a state has adopted. Two studies done eight
years apart show the difficulty in analyzing state standards for changed custody. A 1978
study of 15 states found that only four states had settled on the best interest standard. See
McGough & Shindell, supra note 4, at 214 n.24. The other 11 states upheld the parental
rights standard. See id. The study pointed out, however, that it is sometimes difficult to
assess which standard a state applies. See id. at 215 n.24. For example, some states say
they use the best interest test but actually apply the parental rights standard, while other
states vacillate between the two. See id. A 1986 study found that eight states apply an
irrebuttable parental rights standard to third-party custody disputes, and 29 states apply a
rebuttable presumption parental rights standard. See Haynie, supra, at 708-11 n.22; see
also Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again:
Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1045, 1063-71 (1996) (discussing the various state standards and the
difficulty of classification); Richards, supra note 4, at 737 nn.6, 7, & 9 (listing common law
and statutory standards for child custody disputes); R. Todd Ehlert, Comment, Family
Law: Don't Disobey the Parental Preference Doctrine, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 119, 133 n.91
(1994) (listing the states that bestow custody on parents absent a finding of unfitness).
7. In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992). In the Baby Jessica case, the child's
unwed mother, Cara Clausen, relinquished her parental rights within two days of the
birth, and a Michigan couple, Roberta and Jan DeBoer, filed a petition for adoption and
took custody of the child. See id. at 240-41. The biological mother lied about the identity
of the biological father and had another man sign the form terminating the father's
parental rights. See id. at 241. Once the biological father learned of the birth, he sought
and was allowed to intervene in the adoption proceeding. See id. Eleven months after
Baby Jessica's birth (during which time she had lived with the DeBoers in Michigan), the
Iowa trial judge denied the adoption petition and ordered the child returned to the
biological father in Iowa. See id. There followed appeals to the Iowa appellate court, a
new action filed in the Michigan courts, and an appeal to the United States Supreme
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result in Petersen v. Rogers' was defensible and perhaps for the best,
but the court's underlying holding has caused some consternation for
judges and practitioners. In Petersen, the North Carolina Supreme
Court implicitly disavowed the child's best interest cases and the
broad language of section 50-13.2(a) of the North Carolina General
Statutes9 by holding that no inquiry into the child's interest or welfare
was permitted in custody disputes between biological parents and
third parties unless the biological parent was first shown to be unfit
or to have neglected the child's welfare." The Petersen test-short,
simple, and unambiguous-left no room for judicial discretion or best
interest analysis, even in situations in which the child had established
significant emotional bonds with third parties. Furthermore, the
Petersen court indicated that such third parties were legal "strangers"
to the child, and as such, lacked standing under § 50-13.1 to seek
custody or visitation with the child." The welfare of the children was
no longer the polar star guiding North Carolina courts in resolving
custody disputes. Since the supreme court handed down the Petersen
opinion in July 1994, attorneys, district court judges, and various
panels of the North Carolina Court of Appeals have applied the
Petersen test and have attempted to discern possible limitations on its
application. 2
In 1997, the North Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity
to revisit Petersen in Price v. Howard,13 a case with particularly
compelling facts. The case involved an eight-year-old girl, her fit
14
biological mother, and the man who had raised the child since birth
and whom the child believed to be her biological father. 5 As both
the trial judge and a majority of the court of appeals panel
Court-during which time Baby Jessica was allowed to remain with the DeBoers in
Michigan. See In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(per curiam); DeBoer v. Schmidt, 509 U.S. 938, 938-39 (1993) (Blackmun and O'Connor,
JJ., dissenting). In 1993, after the United States Supreme Court refused to stay the state
court rulings, see DeBoer, 509 U.S. at 938, the DeBoers surrendered the two and one-half
year old Baby Jessica to Daniel Schmidt, the biological father whom the child had never
before met. For a detailed discussion of the Baby Jessica case, see Bernadette Weaver-
Catalana, Comment, The Battle for Baby Jessica: A Conflict of Best Interests, 43 BUFF. L.
REV. 583 (1995).
8. 337 N.C. 397,445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
9. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (Supp. 1997)).
10. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403-04, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
11. See id. at 405, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
12. See infra notes 217-80.
13. 346 N.C. 68,484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).
14. See infra notes 228-47 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of what
constitutes a "fit" parent).
15. See Price, 346 N.C. at 70-71,484 S.E.2d at 529.
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acknowledged, under Petersen the court was required to award
custody to the fit biological mother.16 Perhaps troubled by this result,
the supreme court rewrote the Petersen test to add a third, broadly
defined basis for biological parents to lose their paramount right to
custody, thereby permitting inquiry at the custody hearing into the
best interest of the child. 7 Under Price, conduct of the biological
parent that is "inconsistent" with the presumption that the biological
parent will act in the child's best interest can be sufficient to trump
the Petersen right to custody and, consequently, to allow
consideration of the child's best interest in determining custody.'"
Although Price appears to provide a much needed safety valve
for cases that are ill-served by the rigid Petersen test, many questions
remain for the court of appeals and the trial courts. Several aspects
of the legal analysis of Petersen and Price are not clear, including the
effect of the 1967 custody statutes (§ 50-13.1 and § 50-13.2), the
parameters of the privacy and family interest that is protected by due
process, and whether or not the third-party psychological parents 9 in
both Petersen and Price had standing under § 50-13.1 to bring the
custody actions in the first place.
In Part II, this Article considers the development of the "best
interest of the child" test as the polar star guiding courts in custody
16. See Price v. Howard, 122 N.C. App. 674, 676, 471 S.E.2d 673, 674 (1996), rev'd,
346 N.C. 68,484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).
17. See Price, 346 N.C. at 79,484 S.E.2d at 534-35.
18. See id. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534 ("[Cjonduct inconsistent with the parent's
protected status ... would result in application of the 'best interest of the child' test
without offending the Due Process Clause.").
19. In their ground-breaking book Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, authors
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit contend that the important emotional
attachment a child has to his "parent" is not directly caused by the "physical" realities of
his conception and birth but rather by the "day-to-day attention to his needs for physical
care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (2d ed. 1979). Moreover, the authors
note that:
Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based ... on
day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The role can be
fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any other
caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or
legal relationship to the child may be.
Id. at 19. The authors thus argue that the law governing placement decisions should
safeguard the child's need for continuity of relationships, i.e., should safeguard any
psychological parent-child relationship that has developed between the child and a third
party. See id. at 31-34. But this approach is at odds with the traditional recognition and
protection of a biological parent's right to the custody and control of the child. See, e.g.,
Brickell v. Hines, 179 N.C. 254,254-55, 102 S.E. 309,310 (1920).
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and related matters.2 It explores this development from the first
statement of the doctrine in 1883 to statutory codification in the
1960s through the Petersen decision in 1994.21 Part III analyzes the
facts of Petersen and the issues considered by the North Carolina
Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court.' Part IV
considers whether Petersen provides guidance in cases involving
intact families, changed circumstances, or time limits for the exercise
of parental rights.' Part V revisits the Petersen standard and how its
issues were developed and modified by subsequent cases, most
notably Price.24 Part VI considers issues in third-party custody
proceedings in the wake of Pricey5 The Article concludes with
suggestions for strategies in third-party custody proceedings under
current statutes and case law.26
II. NORTH CAROLINA CUSTODY LAW UNTIL 1994
A. The Shift from the Common Law to the Polar Star
The "polar star" arose in 1883, when the North Carolina
Supreme Court significantly changed its approach to child custody in
In re LewisY The court first pointed out that common law doctrines
had "been greatly weakened of late."' It noted that courts were
looking less exclusively to the "strict legal rights of parents" and
"more to the interests, moral and physical, of the infants."2 9 Then it
summarized its view of the state of affairs at that time: "[W]here the
custody of children is the subject of controversy, the legal rights of
parents ... will be respected by the courts... [; however,] the welfare
of the infants themselves is the polar star by which the discretion of
the courts is to be guided."30  The supreme court appeared to
announce that in resolving custody disputes it would henceforth be
guided by the interest of the child.
This approach contrasted with the English common law, adopted
by most American courts in the early nineteenth century, under
20. See infra notes 27-108 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 27-108 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 109-210 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 211-80 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 281-362 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 363-75 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 376-83 and accompanying text.
27. 88 N.C. 31 (1883).
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
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which children were treated essentially as property owned exclusively
by the husband and father or, if illegitimate, by the mother.31
Initially, no exceptions defeated a parent's property interest in his
child.32 As American society evolved in the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth century, however, public awareness, concern, and
outrage over the treatment of children grew. The courts gradually
acknowledged that states had parens patriae 33 authority to protect
children from abuse and cruelty and upheld criminal child abuse
statutesY3 As an exception to the father's automatic right to custody
and control, many courts adopted the "tender years" doctrine, which
established a rebuttable presumption that the mother, if fit, rather
than the father, should be granted custody of a very young child.35
Nevertheless, these exceptions retained the common law's focus on
the rights of the parents as opposed to the interest or welfare of the
child . The supreme court's decision to consider the welfare of the
31. See generally MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-84 (1994)
(describing child custody laws from colonial era until 1890); Jay Einhorn, Child Custody
in Historical Perspective: A Study of Changing Social Perceptions of Divorce and Child
Custody in Anglo-American Law, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119, 120-28 (1986) (describing the
early common law preference for the father in family matters and a similar preference in
American courts until the late nineteenth century).
32. See Latham v. Ellis, 116 N.C. 30, 33, 20 S.E. 1012, 1012 (1895) ("Under the
common law, the father's claim to the custody of his minor children, under all
circumstances, was paramount."). While recognizing this older principle, however, the
court held that "where the husband and wife are living in a state of separation without
being divorced, the court ... may award the charge and custody of the child or children to
either the husband or the wife, as may appear to be for the best interests and welfare of
the child or children." Id.; see also Tyner v. Tyner, 206 N.C. 776, 780, 175 S.E. 144, 146
(1934) (" 'The father has at common law an unquestioned right of custody and control
over his minor children as against the mother, and still more clearly as against any third
person.'" (quoting Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 70, 162 S.E. 207, 211 (1932))). While
recognizing the common law principle, the court held that "[iln determining the custody
of children, their welfare is the paramount consideration. Even paternal love must yield
to the claims of another, if, after the judicial investigation, it is found that the best interest
of the children is subserved thereby." Id. at 779, 175 S.E.2d at 146.
33. Parens patriae refers to "the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIoNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
34. See Latham, 116 N.C. at 33,20 S.E. at 1012-13 ("In North Carolina the father has
always been entitled to the custody of his children against the claims of every one ...
unless he is found to be unfitted to keep their charge and custody by reason of his brutal
treatment of them, or his reckless neglect of their welfare and interests."); Mason P.
Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 306-22 (1972); Caroline T. Trost, Chilling Child
Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REv. 183, 189-94
(1998).
35. See Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L.
423,425 (1976-77).
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child as the polar star appeared to free custody hearings from this
narrow focus solely on the parents' status and conduct.
For more than 100 years after In re Lewis, the North Carolina
Supreme Court regularly repeated that in custody matters the welfare
of the child was the polar star. 6 As a practical matter, however, the
court's opinions have not always been models of clarity, and they
often appear result-oriented and unclear about the precise test
applied. The traditional interest or right of the biological parent to
custody of his minor child was never lightly disregarded or ignored,
but it was defeated in a variety of situations, generally when "the
morals or safety or interests of the children strongly require[d] it."' 37
36. For example, in Tyner, the court cited the common law rule that the father has
the first priority in custody, but it noted that that rule "'has more recently been
relaxed.' " Tyner, 206 N.C. at 779, 175 S.E. at 146 (quoting Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N.C.
15, 16, 56 S.E. 509, 509 (1907)). While" 'the legal rights of parents and guardians will be
respected by the courts as being founded in nature and wisdom, and essential to the virtue
and happiness of society,' "the court stated, " 'the welfare of the infants themselves is the
polar star by which the courts are to be guided to a right conclusion." Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting Newsome, 144 N.C. at 16, 56 S.E. at 509). The Tyner court concluded
that courts "'may, within certain limits, exercise a sound discretion for the benefit of the
child, and in some cases will order it into the custody of a third person for good and
sufficient reasons.'" Id. (quoting Newsome, 144 N.C. at 15, 56 S.E. at 509); see also
Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 354,-446 S.E.2d 17, 23 (1994) (" 'The welfare or best
interest of the child, in the light of all the circumstances, is the paramount consideration
which guides the court in awarding the custody of the minor child. It is "the polar star by
which the discretion of the court-is guided."' " (quoting Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189,
196, 146 S.E.2d 73, 79 (1966) (quoting 3 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW § 244, at 21 (3d ed. 1963))); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246,
251 (1984) (emphasizing that "the fundamental principle underlying North Carolina's
approach to controversies involving child neglect and custody [is] ... to wit, that the best
interest of the child is the polar star. The fact that a parent does provide love, affection
and concern ... should not be determinative."); In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 645-46, 290
S.E.2d 664, 667-68 (1982) ("[T]he 'paramount consideration' and 'polar star,' which have
long governed and guided the discretion of our trial judges .... are the welfare and needs
of the child, not the persons seeking his or her custody, and even parental love must yield
to the promotion of those higher interests." (citations omitted)); Shepherd v. Shepherd,
273 N.C. 71, 75, 159 S.E.2d 357, 361 (1968) (" 'The welfare of the child in controversies
involving custody is the polar star by which the courts must be guided in awarding
custody.'" (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 467, 130 S.E.2d 871, 876 (1963))).
Many older cases held similarly. See, e.g., Chriscoe v. Chriscoe, 268 N.C. 554, 556, 151
S.E.2d 33, 34 (1966) (per curiam); Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 201, 97 S.E.2d 683,
684 (1957) (per curiam); Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630, 635, 97 S.E.2d 96, 100-01
(1957); Finley v. Sapp, 238 N.C. 114, 117,76 S.E.2d 350,352 (1953); In re Turner, 151 N.C.
474, 477, 66 S.E. 431, 432 (1909) (note that this is the case name as it appears in the North
Carolina Reporter; it is entitled Ex parte Turner in the South Eastern Reporter);
Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N.C. 15,16,56 S.E. 509,509 (1907).
37. Atkinson v. Downing, 175 N.C. 244, 247, 95 S.E. 487, 488 (1918) (stating that
"parents have prima facie the right of the custody and control of their infant children, a
natural and substantive right not to be lightly denied or interfered with except when the
good of the child clearly requires it"); see also Spitzer v. Lewark, 259 N.C. 50, 59, 129
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Three cases are illustrative. In James v. Pretlow,38 twins were
born to parents who soon thereafter divorced. Both parents
remarried and shared custody39 of the twins.40 The natural father was
killed in an automobile accident when the twins were fifteen.41 The
natural mother, Carolyn Christie James, and the step-mother, Ruth
Raines Pretlow, each sought custody of the twins.42 The trial judge
found that the twins had equal affection and love for their mother,
stepmother, and stepfather, that the mother and stepmother were
both women of good character, that their respective homes were fit
and proper places for the twins to live, and that the twins desired to
live with their stepmother so that they could continue to attend the
same high school.43 The judge concluded that the best interest,
welfare, and happiness of the children would be promoted by
awarding custody to the stepmother.44
On appeal, the supreme court summarized the applicable law,
noting that when there is only one living parent, that person "has a
natural and legal right to the custody" of his children.45 While that
"right is not absolute," the court stated, it can be challenged "only for
the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial
control only when the interests and welfare of the children clearly
require it."'46 A balance must be struck, the court noted, between the
child's "happiness and welfare" and "the legal rights of parents. '47
Finally, the court added that the law should "'work in harmony with
nature'" to uphold" 'those ties which bind man to his own flesh.' "48
S.E.2d 620, 623 (1963) (stating that the courts should not interfere with parental rights
unless the interest and welfare of the child clearly requires it); Brickell v. Hines, 179 N.C.
254,254-55, 102 S.E. 309,310 (1920) (noting that parents have prima facie the right to the
custody of infant children and that courts must duly protect this substantive right).
38. 242 N.C. 102,86 S.E.2d 759 (1955).
39. For a detailed discussion of various shared custody arrangements, see Persia
Woolley, Shared Parenting Arrangements, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING,
supra note 4, at 16-24.
40. See Pretlow, 242 N.C. at 103, 86 S.E.2d at 760.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 103, 86 S.E.2d at 760-61.
43. See id. at 103-04, 86 S.E.2d at 760-61.
44. See id. at 104,86 S.E.2d at 760-61.
45. Id. at 104, 86 S.E.2d at 761.
46. Id. (citations omitted). The court reiterated this point by quoting similar
language from its decision in Tyner "'In determining the custody of children, their
welfare is the paramount consideration. Even parental love must yield to the claims of
another, if, after judicial investigation, it is found that the best interest of the children is
subserved thereby.'" Id. at 105, 86 S.E.2d at 761 (quoting Tyner v. Tyner, 206 N.C. 776,
779, 175 S.E. 144, 146 (1934)).
47. Id. at 105, 86 S.E.2d at 761.
48. Id. (quoting Morris v. Grant, 27 S.E.2d 295,296 (Ga. 1943)).
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The court concluded that in order for a third party to prevail over a
parent for custody of a child, " 'there must be substantial reasons or,
as various courts have put it, the reasons must be real, compelling,
cogent, weighty, strong, powerful, serious, or grave.' "9 The court
made a distinction between the weight given to the child's desire in
choosing between natural parents and choosing between a parent and
a third party. When the choice is between parents, courts should give
"considerable weight" to the child's wish when the child is old
enough "to exercise discretion."' But when the choice is between
the parent and a third party, the child's desire should "not ordinarily
prevail over the natural right of the parent, unless essential to the
child's welfare."'"
The supreme court then affirmed the award of custody to the
stepmother for the upcoming school year, noting that it was clearly in
the best interests of the children.52 The court vacated that part of the
trial court's order providing for custody beyond the upcoming school
year on the grounds that, as to that time period, the trial court's
findings of fact did not "clearly and plainly show that [the children's]
interests and welfare [would] be promoted by awarding their custody
to their stepmother. 5 3  The court in Pretlow thus held that the
biological parent's natural right to custody was subject to challenge,
not only by evidence of that parent's unfitness or other conduct
evidencing neglect or abandonment, but also by clear and compelling
evidence that the best interest of the children required custody with
another.54
In In re Gibbons,55 the adoptive (and thus legally natural)56
father sought custody of his seven-year-old son who had been raised
by the Brights, a couple unrelated to the boy but in whose care the
49. Id. (quoting 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 20b (1978) (footnotes omitted)).
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 20b (1978)).
52. See id. at 106, 86 S.E.2d 759, 762-63.
53. Id.
54. See id. Similarly, in Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 97 S.E.2d 683 (1957) (per
curiam), the trial judge rejected the custody claim of a natural father with "a good
reputation" in favor of continued custody with the maternal grandparents. The supreme
court upheld the custody order, noting that it was "in accord with our decisions that the
child's welfare is the paramount consideration, and that a parent's love must yield to
another if, after judicial investigation, it is found that the best interest of the child is
subserved thereby." Id. at 201, 97 S.E.2d at 684.
55. 247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957).
56. Adoptive parents are considered the legal parents of a child. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-1-106 (1995).
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father had left the boy for several years. 7 The trial court applied the
polar star test and found both parties fit, but found that the Brights'
evidence did not show that the best interest of the child clearly
required that custody be awarded to them; accordingly, the trial court
awarded custody to the father.5 8 The supreme court reversed on the
basis that the trial court had not sufficiently factored into its best
interest analysis the great attachment the child had formed with the
Brights.5 9 It noted that the boy had this strong attachment because
the father had "voluntarily" left the boy with the Brights from age
two and one-half until age seven.6 The court emphasized that
because of the father's actions, the Brights had become "all [the boy]
knows of home."' 6' Consequently, the court held that the father's
"little interest" in the child served to tip the balance in favor of the
child's wishes. 62 Critical to the court's analysis was "that the love and
affection of the child and the foster parents have become mutually
engaged, to the extent that a severance of this relationship would tear
the heart of the child, and mar his happiness."63 Thus, the Gibbons
court applied the polar star test and best interest analysis and
impliedly emphasized the importance of several factors, including:
(1) whether the child has long been in the custody of the third party;
(2) whether a psychological family relationship has developed; and
(3) whether the natural parent's conduct caused or contributed to this
situation.
Likewise, in In re Custody of Hughes,64 the supreme court upheld
the trial court's award of custody to the grandmother instead of the
mother based, among other things, upon the mother's unfitness.65
The court's analysis, however, left little doubt that parental unfitness
was just one way of justifying a denial of custody to a biological
parent. The court acknowledged the presumption of a natural
parent's "prior right to custody," but noted that such a right was not
absolute. 6 "[T]he crucial test," it stated, is "[t]he welfare of the
child," and by neglecting the child's "welfare and interest," a parent
57. See Gibbons, 247 N.C. at 274-76, 101 S.E.2d at 17-18.
5& See id. at 275-77, 101 S.E.2d at 18-19.
59. See id. at 282, 101 S.E.2d at 21, 23.
60. Id. at 280, 101 S.E.2d at 21.
61. Id.
62. 1d
63. Id. at 280, 101 S.E.2d at 21-22.
64. 254 N.C. 434, 119 S.E.2d 189 (1961).
65. See id- at 435, 119 S.E.2d at 190.
66. Id. at 436-37, 119 S.E.2d at 191.
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can "waive[] his usual right of custody."'6 The court quoted with
approval Justice Parker's statement in In re Gibbons that parents
have no "'controlling'" legal right to their children "'when
circumstances connected with the present and prospective welfare of
the child clearly exist to overcome it, or when to enforce such legal
right will imperil the personal safety, morals, or health of the
child.' "6s One of these circumstances is when the child has been in
the custody of the third party for a significant period of time.69 The
court in Hughes thus stated a test that, consistent with the polar star
cases Pretlow7° and Holmes,71 encompasses more than unfitness. In
such cases, the court must "determine facts necessary to make an
award" of custody.72
Even in cases when the courts appeared to award custody using
the natural parent presumption, the analysis actually employed by
the courts focused on the child's interest. For instance, in In re
Fain,7' the supreme court reversed the trial judge's award of custody
to the child's two grandmothers on the basis that the father was
entitled to custody as a matter of right, unless it appeared that he was
an unfit or unsuitable person to whom to entrust the child's welfare.74
Nevertheless, the Fain court included the broader term "unsuitable"
in its test and the opinion focused on the lack of evidence of the
father's unsuitability and the uncontradicted evidence of the father's
ability to take good care of the child.75 In particular, the court noted
that the father lived with his parents, who were "people of good
character and well-to-do financially," and that the father's mother
was "a woman of most excellent character" who "had agreed to rear
the child for her son. 7 6  While the court claimed to decide the case
on narrower grounds, the broad unsuitability test, coupled with the
67. Id. at 437, 119 S.E.2d at 191.
68. Id. (quoting In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273,278, 101 S.E.2d 16,20 (1957)).
69. See id. (stating that a true "stranger" may not be able to challenge the custody
right of a fit parent, but "the person having custody" of the child can do so); cf. Thomas v.
Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 467, 130 S.E.2d 871, 876 (1963) (upholding the trial court's award
of legal custody to the fit father on the condition that the physical custody of the children
be vested in their maternal grandparents with whom they had lived for most of their
lives).
70. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text (discussing James v. Pretlow, 242
N.C. 102, 86 S.E.2d 759 (1955)).
71. See supra note 54 (discussing Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 97 S.E.2d 683
(1957) (per curiam)).
72. Hughes, 254 N.C. at 437,119 S.E.2d at 191.
73. 172 N.C. 790,90 S.E. 928 (1916).
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court's focus on the facts establishing the father's suitability to raise
the child, indicates that the court was focused on the welfare of the
child-and, arguably, followed the best interest of the child cases."
Similarly, in Newsome v. Bunch,78 the supreme court upheld an
order removing custody from the grandparents and giving custody to
the fit father when the evidence showed the father had not
abandoned the child.79 In one part of the opinion, the court stated
that the father had done nothing to "incur[] a forfeiture of his right to
the custody of his offspring," and that, consequently, there was "no
room for the exercise even of a sound discretion in favor of the
grandparents who now have possession of the child.""0 Moreover, the
court stated that the award of custody to the father was permissible
because the grandparents had not shown "that the interests and
welfare of the child [would] be materially prejudiced by ...
restoration [of custody] to the [father]."" Again, the actual test
applied by Newsome appears to comport with the polar star cases:
The father's right to custody can be lost if he is proven unfit, if he is
found to have engaged in improper conduct, or if the interest and
welfare of the child clearly require it.
By the 1970s, commentators, lawyers, and judges generally
accepted the notion that in custody disputes between a natural parent
and a third party, a best interest inquiry was required to determine if
the presumption of natural parent custody should be rebutted.82 The
77. See supra notes 38-72 (discussing best interest of the child cases). This
interpretation is supported by the concurring and dissenting justices in Fain. In his
concurrence, Justice Walker stated that the opinion did not hold that the parent's right to
custody was "absolute or unquestionable." Fain, 172 N.C. at 792, 90 S.E. at 928 (Walker,
J., concurring). While the parent does have "the preferred or paramount right," Justice
Walker continued, "he may lose it by his conduct or other causes resulting in unfitness."
Id. (Walker, J., concurring). He endorsed the court's "sound discretion" to award custody
to someone other than a parent "'when the facts and circumstances justify'" such a
decision, but he concluded that the facts of Fain did not present such a situation. Id. at
791, 90 S.E. at 929 (Walker, J., concurring) (quoting Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N.C. 15, 17,
56 S.E. 509, 510 (1907)). Chief Justice Clark, on the other hand, applied the same rule to
reach the opposite conclusion, arguing that the trial judge had sufficient evidence to find
that the father was "not a fit person to be entrusted with [the child's] care at this tender
age," and that the trial judge had used "sound discretion" to place the baby in the custody
of the child's grandmothers. Id. at 795, 90 S.E. at 929 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
78. 144 N.C. 15,56 S.E. 509 (1907).
79. See id. at 17-18,56 S.E. at 510.
80. Id. at 17-18,56 S.E. at 510.
81. Id. at 16,56 S.E.2d at 509.
82. The rebuttable presumption rule was summarized by Professor Robert E. Lee in
his treatise on family law in North Carolina. See 3 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA
FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 1963). He stated that in cases with "unusual circumstances" and
when justified by the child's best interest, a court may award custody to "grandparents or
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North Carolina Court of Appeals held repeatedly that custody can be
granted to a third party without a determination that the parents are
unfit. For example, in In re Kowalzek,s3 the court of appeals stated
that while the parent's fitness was "of paramount significance in
determining the best interests of the child," fitness was not
determinative.' Accordingly, the court held that trial courts need
not declare the natural parent unfit in order to award custody of a
child to a third party.85 Similarly, in Best v. Best,6 the court stated
that although there is a presumption in favor of the natural parent,
that presumption is rebuttable.' The court concluded that "it is not
necessary for the natural parent to be found unfit for the
presumption to be overcome."88
others." 3 id. § 224, at 24. In some cases, he said, "'a parent's love must yield ... if ...
the best interest of the child is served thereby.'" 3 id. at 24-25 (quoting James v. Pretlow
242 N.C. 102, 105, 86 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1955)). But, Professor Lee concluded, the
"rebuttable presumption [is] that the child's welfare will be best served by committing it
to the custody of one or the other of the parents." 3 id. This presumption, he stated, can
be rebutted only by "convincing proof that the parent is an unfit person ... or for some
other extraordinary fact or circumstance." 3 id. (citing 2 WILLIAM T. NELSON, NELSON
ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.15, at 246-47 (F. Reed Poore et al. eds., 2d ed. rev.
1961)).
83. 37 N.C. App. 364,246 S.E.2d 45 (1978).
84. Id. at 368, 246 S.E.2d at 47.
85. See id.
86. 81 N.C. App. 337,344 S.E.2d 363 (1986).
87. See id. at 342,344 S.E.2d at 367.
88. Id.; see also In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 688, 315 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1984)
(holding that in a child abuse and neglect action the primary concern of the trial court
should be the welfare of the child and that this concern outweighs any presumption
favoring award of custody to a biological parent); Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324,
328, 300 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1983) (stating that finding a natural parent unfit is not a
prerequisite to awarding custody to a third person) (citing In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App.
364, 368, 246 S.E.2d 45, 47 (1978)). In In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334, 339, 188 S.E.2d 580,
582 (1972), the court noted that even if another person could provide "better care and
greater comforts and protection," the child's best interest still lies with the parent. Id. at
339, 246 S.E.2d at 47. According to the court, parental rights can be overcome "only by
misconduct or by other facts which substantially affect the child's welfare." Id.; see also
Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 630, 184 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1971) (noting that the
paramount right of the father to custody is "a relic of the past," and that the best interest
test is used by the courts and required by § 50-13.2); Roberts v. Short, 6 N.C. App. 419,
420-21, 169 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1969) (holding that in a contest between the father and the
maternal grandparents, where the mother was unfit, the father alone had a natural right
to custody absent reasons that the welfare of the child requires a denial of that right);
Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 163, 167 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1969) (upholding the trial
court's award of custody to grandparents on the basis that the welfare of the children "at
the present time would be served by leaving them with persons with whom they are
familiar").
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B. Statutory Adoption and Codification of the Polar Star Test
In 1967, the North Carolina General Assembly codified the best
interest test and granted third parties the right to seek custody by
court proceeding.89 One of the statutes provides that "[a]ny parent,
relative, or other person" who claims the right to custody of a minor
child may institute an action for custody.90 Another statute provides
that in such custody actions, the court shall award custody to "such
person, agency, organization or institution as will best promote the
interest and welfare of the child." 91 Courts have determined that the
General Assembly's purpose was "to bring all of the statutes relating
to child custody and support together into one act"' and to codify the
rule "which had been many times announced by the North Carolina
Supreme Court to the effect that in custody cases the welfare of the
child is the polar star by which the court's decision must ever be
guided."'93 After 1967, several decisions of the court of appeals
expressly relied on the new statutory best interest test as the basis,
along with the polar star cases, for justifying an award of custody to a
third party instead of to a fit parent.9 4
C. The Standing Issue: Who Can Seek Custody?
Early North Carolina child custody cases did not expressly
address the issue of third party standing.95 The Brights, the third-
party couple in In re Gibbons, were not related by blood to the child,
yet they were permitted to bring an action for custody against the
natural father.96 Their interest in bringing the custody action-and
their substantive argument that their continued custody of the child
89. See Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1153, § 2, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1772, 1772 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.1 & 50-13.2(a) (1995 & Supp. 1997)).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1995).
91. Id. § 50-13.2(a) (Supp. 1997).
92. In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 111, 160 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1968); see also Johnson v.
Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 379, 188 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1972) (describing the General
Assembly's purposes in enacting § 50-13.1 and § 50-13.2).
93. In re Custody of Pitts, 2 N.C. App. 211,212, 162 S.E.2d 524,525 (1968).
94. See, e.g., In re Custody of Cox, 17 N.C. App. 687, 688-90, 195 S.E.2d 132, 134
(1973) (upholding an award of custody to the Department of Social Services based on the
child's best interest); In re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 548, 179 S.E.2d 844, 847
(1971) (remanding for further determination of the child's best interest); Greer v. Greer,
5 N.C. App. 160, 162, 167 S.E.2d 782,783 (1969) (determining that an award of custody to
the grandparents was in the child's best interest).
95. See, e.g., In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273,275-78, 101 S.E.2d 16, 17-20 (1957).
96. The North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that the Brights's substantial
historical relationship could justify their custody claim over a fit father. See id. at 279-80,
101 S.E.2d at 21-22; supra notes 55-63 (discussing Gibbons).
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was in the child's best interest-was based on the psychological
relationship they had developed with the child during the several
years the child had lived in their home.97 The question facing the
court was whether the Brights had standing to bring this action, given
that they were not "factual" strangers to the child, but were
"biological" strangers. Gibbons appears consistent with the
interpretation that while "parents have a strict legal right to have the
custody of their infant children as against strangers," this right will
not control "when circumstances connected with the present and
prospective welfare of the child clearly exist to overcome it, or when
to enforce such legal right will imperil the personal safety, morals, or
health of the child." 98 But Gibbons, and the other polar star cases in
general, do not clearly indicate whether this matter is one of standing
to bring the custody action in the first place or simply a significant set
of facts to be considered in deciding what the child's best interest
clearly requires.
Standing to bring an action is often addressed by statute.99 In
97. See Gibbons, 247 N.C. at 274-76, 101 S.E.2d at 17-18.
98. Id. at 276-78, 101 S.E.2d at 18-20.
99. For examples of court interpretations of statutory standing, see Hyde v. Abbott
Lab., 123 N.C. App. 572, 575-84, 473 S.E.2d 680, 682-88 (1996) (regarding N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-16 (1994) and standing in unfair and deceptive trade practices provisions);
Tucker v. City of Clinton, 120 N.C. App. 776, 781, 463 S.E.2d 806, 810-11 (1995)
(regarding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-10 (1984) and standing in legitimation cases); Fleet Nat'l
Bank v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 117 N.C. App. 387, 388-91, 451 S.E.2d 325, 327-28
(1994) (regarding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (1991) and standing in real estate
foreclosure sales); In re Carr, 116 N.C. App. 403, 405, 448 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1994)
(regarding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.24(6) (1987) and standing in termination of
guardian ad litem status).
In Johnson v. Johnson, 120 N.C. App. 1, 461 S.E.2d 369 (1995), rev'd, 343 N.C. 114,
468 S.E.2d 59 (1996), Judge Walker argued in dissent that § 8-50.1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes did not confer standing upon an alleged natural parent to compel a
presumed father to submit to a blood test to determine the paternity of a child born
during the marriage of the presumed father to the natural mother. See id. at 14, 461
S.E.2d at 376 (Walker, J., dissenting). The supreme court subsequently reversed the
Johnson majority and adopted Judge Walker's dissenting opinion. See Johnson v.
Johnson, 343 N.C. 114,115, 468 S.E.2d 59, 60 (1996).
Although the General Assembly has authority to limit those who have standing to
pursue certain actions, there may be a constitutional or a prudential limitation on its
authority to expand standing to persons with only tangential interests in the action. As
several courts have noted: "'The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party
seeking relief has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentations of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."' "
Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 28, 199 S.E.2d 641, 650
(1973) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962))); see also Love v. Tyson, 119 N.C. App. 739, 744, 460 S.E.2d 204, 206
(1995) (defining standing as when a party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
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North Carolina, the right to bring custody actions is addressed in
§ 50-13.1, which states that "[a]ny parent, relative, or other person...
claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action
or proceeding for the custody of such child."1 0 This statute places no
clear limitation on the right of biological or factual strangers to bring
custody actions. In Oxendine v. Catawba County Department of
Social Services,"' the supreme court held that § 50-13.1 was intended
to cover a myriad of situations involving custody disputes, but that
this broad statutory grant of standing to contest custody was limited
in some cases by other, narrower statutes that address standing in
specific situations." z
However, in certain custody disputes between biological parents
and third parties, no other narrower, applicable statute limits the
broad grant of standing in § 50-13.1.103 Two cases of the court of
appeals, Ray v. Ray'" and In re Custody of Rooker,10 5 held that the
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy). The General Assembly's
authority to confer standing upon a person who lacks a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy may be restricted by the North Carolina Constitution. See N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 18 ("All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him ... shall have
remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor,
denial or delay."). But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975) ("Congress may
create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer
standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable
injury in the absence of statute.").
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1995).
101. 303 N.C. 699,281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).
102. See id. at 707, 281 S.E.2d at 375 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 50-13.1 (1995)). For
example, in connection with the release of children for adoption, the court stated that
§ 48-9.1 applied only when a natural parent surrenders custody of a child under § 48-
9(a)(1). See id. Thus, the court concluded that the legislature had intended § 48-9.1 "as
an exception to the general grant of standing to contest custody set forth in G.S. 50-13.1."
Id. The court noted, however, that this grant of general standing conflicted with § 7A-
289.33 (repealed in 1979), and it concluded that the legislature did not intend § 50-13.1 to
apply in adoption proceedings. See id. The court of appeals held likewise in Swing v.
Garrison, 112 N.C. App. 818, 436 S.E.2d 895 (1993), determining that § 50-13.1 did not
apply in Chapter 7A proceedings regarding custody or visitation of children who had been
surrendered for adoption and placed in the custody of the Department of Social Services.
See id. at 821-22, 436 S.E.2d at 897-98 (citing Oxendine, 303 N.C. at 707, 281 S.E.2d at
375).
103. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995). In
McIntyre, the court stated that § 50-13.1(a) contains no grant of standing to grandparents
to ask for visitation with a child with an intact family and no custody dispute pending. See
id. at 631, 461 S.E.2d at 747. Moreover, the court determined that such a right to sue for
visitation exists only when the child is not in the custody of the parent. See id. (citing N.C.
GEN. STAT. §8 50-13.2(b)(1), 50-13.5, and 50-13.2A).
104. 103 N.C. App. 790, 793, 407 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1991) (holding that the step-
grandmother qualified as an "other person" under § 50-13.1 with standing to bring an
action seeking visitation).
105. 43 N.C. App. 397, 398, 258 S.E.2d 828, 829 (1979) (holding that although the
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legislature intended § 50-13.1 to confer upon strangers the right to
bring custody or visitation actions against the parents of children
unrelated to them.1°6 The Ray opinion noted, however, that this
broad grant of standing might "involve constitutional issues relating
to the substantive due process interests in the care and custody of
one's children," but because neither party had raised the issue, the
court did not address it.1°7
D. Summary of North Carolina's Third-Party Custody Law as It
Stood Prior to Petersen
By early 1994, the case law, statutes, and treatises were unified in
their understanding of the essential test for determining custody
issues between natural parents and third parties. The absolute
property rights of the common law had given way to considerations
of the interest and welfare of the child. The courts still presumed
that it was in the best interest of the child that the natural parent
have the care, custody, and control of the child and the burden was
on the third party to show facts to the contrary. This burden was
greater than simply showing that the child would have more
advantages in the custody of the third party. The third party had to
bring forth exceptional or unusual circumstances sufficient to show
that the child's best interest required custody in the third party.
These exceptional or unusual circumstances included the biological
parent's unfitness or unsuitability, other conduct by the biological
parent that affected the welfare of the child, and other attachments
or relationships of the child that affected the welfare of the child.
Biological strangers to the child had standing to bring custody
actions, but they would be unlikely to prevail on the merits of the
action without a strong factual connection to the child that was
directly relevant to the child's interest and welfare.
This complicated but functional test-the product of 100 years of
jurisprudence-balanced three important interests: (1) the natural
parents' interest in raising their child; (2) the state's interest in
ensuring that children are cared for properly; and (3) the child's
interest in being cared for properly. The test eschewed hard and fast
rules for limited judicial discretion. In some cases, however, the test,
father's consent to the adoption of his children rendered him a legal stranger to them, he
did have rights as an "other person" to claim custody).
106. In Ray, the court described other visitation statutes as "merely supplemental,"
and stated that these statutes-§§ 50-13.2A, 50-13.2(b)(1), and 50-13.5()-"do not in any
way contradict § 50-13.1(a)." Ray, 103 N.C. App. at 793,407 S.E.2d at 593.
107. Id. at 793, 407 S.E.2d at 593-94.
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the courts' application of the test, and the legal process itself
appeared subject to manipulation by determined third parties. This
perception of manipulation led to a reconsideration of the balancing
of these three interests in Petersen v. Rogers.108
III. PETERSEN V. ROGERS
A. The Legal Legacy of Baby Paul
Baby Paul, referred to as "P.E.P.," was conceived in December
1987 in Michigan, where his mother, Pamela Rogers, was living with
William Rowe, the biological father.109 Rogers left Rowe in May
1988 at about the same time that she became involved with a
religious organization known as "The Way International" ("The
Way").110 Encouraged by friends in The Way, Rogers decided to
place her child for adoption through other members.' She consulted
with Douglas Hargrave, a North Carolina attorney and a member of
The Way, about adoption by a North Carolina couple. 2
On June 12, 1988, Rogers flew to North Carolina, where she
stayed until Baby Paul was born on September 9, 1988.113 Hargrave
paid for most, if not all, of Rogers's transportation to North Carolina
and her living and medical expenses while in the state.11 4 Hargrave
had been paid $3500 by William and Patricia Petersen, also The Way
members and North Carolina residents, to assist them in adopting
Rogers's child.1 Immediately after the birth, Rogers signed a
release and gave Baby Paul to the Petersens." 6 Rogers then returned
to Michigan." 7 The Petersens filed a petition for adoption in Orange
County, and the interlocutory adoption decree was entered on
November 17, 1988.118
108. Manipulation does appear to have been a concern in Petersen. Cf Clausen v.
DeBoer, 501 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Mich. App. 1993) (noting that the Iowa court that
removed custody from the adoptive parents and awarded custody to the natural parents
also awarded costs and attorney's fees to the natural parents because of the adoptive
parents' "reprehensible" conduct); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1976)
(stating that "those who obtain custody of children unlawfully... must be deterred").




113. See id. at 695, 407 S.E.2d at 507.
114. See id at 696, 407 S.E.2d at 507.
115. See id. at 695, 407 S.E.2d at 506.
116. See id at 697, 407 S.E.2d at 508.
117. See id. at 698, 407 S.E.2d at 508.
118. See id at 699, 407 S.E.2d at 509.
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On December 27, 1988, Rogers and Rowe filed a motion in
North Carolina for relief from the adoption decree, alleging fraud,
undue influence, and various irregularities in the adoption
procedures.1 9 They also stated that Rowe was the natural father
whose rights had not been terminated. 20 On May 25, 1989, the trial
court denied the motion, and Rogers and Rowe appealed .'2 The trial
court expressly found that it was "in the best interest of the child to
remain in the care, custody and control of the [Petersens]."'22
1. State Policy Against Buying and Selling Babies: In re Adoption of
P.E.P.
On appeal, Rogers and Rowe argued that the trial court erred in
awarding the Petersens custody because the court had never declared
Rogers and Rowe unfit.' The North Carolina Court of Appeals
disagreed, 4 rejecting the argument by Rogers and Rowe that a court
must declare the biological parents unfit in order to find adoption to
be in the child's best interest." s Both the adoption statute and case
law, the court said, "make it clear that while the trial court must be
guided by a balancing of interests, these in turn must always be
resolved in favor of what is in the best interest of the child under the
circumstances of a particular case.' 112 6
In addition, the court stated, "procedural defects" cannot
overcome the best interest test, adding that any such defects "should
be resolved in favor of the minor child."'27 The court took note of the
North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in In re Adoption of
Clark'" that held that an unwed biological father was not bound by




122. In re Adoption of P.E.P., 100 N.C. App. 191, 199-200, 395 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1990),
rev'd, 329 N.C. 692,407 S.E.2d 505 (1991).
123. See id. at 201, 395 S.E.2d at 139.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Id. It is interesting to note that Justice Parker, the future author of the
unanimous opinion in Petersen, concurred at the appellate level with Judge Wells's
majority opinion in In re Adoption of P.E.P. See id. at 203, 395 S.E.2d at 140.
127. Id. The plaintiff had alleged that he was, never served with notice of the adoption
hearing as specified in Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court
said he had actual notice, and that even if he should have received Rule 4 notice, the best
interest of the child overrode this procedural defect. See id. at 201, 395 S.E.2d at 139.
128. 327 N.C. 61,393 S.E.2d 791 (1990).
129. See id. at 68-69, 393 S.E.2d at 795-96.
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distinguished Clark on the grounds that the father in that case, unlike
Rowe, never had actual notice of the proceedings.1 0
Judge Duncan's dissent in P.E.P. was not based on any
paramount right of a biological parent. Judge Duncan agreed that
defects in procedure cannot overcome the child's best interest, but in
her opinion, the defects in P.E.P. were "serious enough that we set a
dangerous precedent by holding that this adoption may stand in spite
of them.""' In particular, Judge Duncan thought this case involved
"conduct that suggests a child was purchased.132
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with
Judge Duncan and reversed the trial court and the court of appeals.133
The supreme court held that North Carolina's policy was "to prevent
the buying and selling of babies"" and that the evidence in the case
would support an inference that baby-selling occurred.135 Justice
Frye, writing for the majority, expressly agreed with the language
from Judge Duncan's dissent."16
Justice Webb dissented, stating that "[t]he controlling, salient
consideration in adoption cases is the interest of the child. '137 He
noted that the General Assembly had intended to protect the
relationship of children with their adoptive parents from claims of
natural parents based on some procedural defect in connection with
the adoption. 38 Thus, the matter was remanded-four days before
Baby Paul's third birthday-to Orange County District Court for
another hearing to determine whether custody should remain with
the Petersens or be transferred to Rogers and Rowe, the biological
parents.3
2. Cults and Freedom of Religion: Petersen v. Rogers
At the first district court hearing in 1989, Rogers and Rowe
130. See In re Adoption of P.E.P., 100 N.C. App. at 203, 395 S.E.2d at 140 (citing
Clark, 327 N.C. at 69, 393 S.E.2d at 795).
131. Id. at 206,395 S.E.2d at 142 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Duncan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
133. See In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329 N.C. 692, 703-04, 407 S.E.2d. 505, 511-12 (1991).
134. Id. at 701, 407 S.E.2d at 509-10.
135. See id. at 701, 407 S.E.2d at 510.
136. See id. at 703,407 S.E.2d at 511.
137. Id. at 704, 407 S.E.2d at 512 (Webb, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 704-05,407 S.E.2d at 512 (Webb, J., dissenting) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 48-1-101(1)(2) (1984) (repealed 1996)).
139. See id. at 704, 407 S.E.2d at 511-12. The supreme court remanded for vacation of
the adoption proceeding and to hear the newly-filed custody petitions of the Petersens
and the Orange County Department of Social Services. See Petersen v. Rogers, 111 N.C.
App. 712,714,433 S.E.2d 770,772.
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unsuccessfully sought to introduce the testimony of an expert on
destructive religious cults and behavior modification, because both
subjects related to the Petersens' involvement with The Way.14° At
the second hearing, which occurred in November of 1991, Cynthia S.
Kisser, an expert on religious cults, was allowed to testify that: (1)
The Way "did not follow 'traditional Christian beliefs' "; (2) The
Way's "concept of the Trinity is 'heresy' "; (3) The Way's "practice of
speaking in tongues [is] 'classic hypnosis' and 'an altered state of
consciousness' "; and (4) "in her expert opinion [The Way] is a
'destructive cult.' ",141 The district court permitted extensive inquiry
into the Petersens' religious views and practices and, on November
15, 1991, denied the Petersens' custody request and ordered that
Baby Paul be transferred immediately to his biological parents.
The court found that both Rogers and Rowe and the Petersens were
"fit and proper" persons to have custody of Baby Paul, that the child
was not eligible for adoption because the biological father's parental
rights had not been terminated, and that for other reasons it was in
the child's best interest to live with his biological parents with no
visitation rights granted to the Petersens.'
The Petersens appealed.'" The court of appeals acknowledged
that "[a]s part of the best interests analysis" the trial court had
correctly considered the child's physical, mental, and spiritual
welfare, but stated that the inquiry into the child's spiritual welfare
must be performed carefully so as not to infringe upon the parents'
constitutionally-protected religious freedom. 45 The court held that
the district court's "inquisition" of the Petersens' religious practices
delved too deeply in the absence of evidence of any connection to
present or future harm to the child.146 The court of appeals reversed
the district court and remanded the case for "proceedings free from
unwarranted religious inquisition into the beliefs of the parties."'47
The court did not address any other issues in its opinion filed on
140. See In re Adoption of P.E.P., 100 N.C. App. 191,199, 395 S.E.2d 133,138 (1990).
141. Petersen v. Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 712, 715, 433 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1993) (quoting
Kisser's testimony), rev'd, 337 N.C. 397, 406, 445 S.E.2d 901, 906 (1994).
142 See id. at 714,433 S.E.2d at 772.
143. See id. at 716-17, 433 S.E.2d at 773-74. The trial court was concerned that if it
granted custody to the Petersens, Rogers and Rowe-because their parental rights could
not be terminated-might bring subsequent motions for change of custody during Paul's
minority, thus perpetuating the uncertainty and lack of finality that Paul had experienced
up to that time.
144. See id. at 713-14,433 S.E.2d at 772.
145. Id. at 717, 433 S.E.2d at 774.
146. See id. at 725, 433 S.E.2d at 778.
147. Id.
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September 7, 1993-two days before Baby Paul celebrated his fifth
birthday.148 Rogers and Rowe appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court.49
3. The Paramount Right of Biological Parents: Petersen v. Rogers
On appeal, the supreme court did not discuss the freedom of
religion analysis used by the court of appeals, holding that if the
district court had committed error in this regard, it was harmless. 5 It
was harmless, the court stated, because the district court had no
authority to apply the best interest analysis or to award custody to
anyone other than the biological parents, 5' who had a
"constitutionally-protected paramount right to custody, care, and
control of their child."'' 5 The court held that this paramount right is
absolute "absent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have
neglected the welfare of their children."''
The surprising holding of Petersen v. Rogers was that absent a
finding of parental unfitness or child abuse or neglect, the best
interest of the child was neither the polar star nor even properly
considered. In other words, the best interest of the child was no
longer relevant. Thus, a few months before his sixth birthday, Baby
Paul was legally united with his biological parents. 54
The supreme court also resolved the Petersens' request for
visitation. Although the district court had held that such visitation
was not in the child's best interest, the supreme court held that § 50-
13.1 "was not intended to confer upon strangers the right to bring
custody or visitation actions against parents of children unrelated to
such strangers" because "[s]uch a right would conflict with the
constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody,
care, and control of their children."'55 Thus, the Petersens, who were
148. See id. at 712, 433 S.E.2d at 770.
149. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 398, 445 S.E.2d at 902.
150. See id. at 400, 445 S.E.2d at 903.
151. See id. at 404, S.E.2d at 905.
152 Id. at 400, 445 S.E.2d at 903 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 403-04, 445 S.E.2d at 905 (emphasis added). This paramount right
argument apparently had been raised by Rogers and Rowe at each previous hearing and
appeal, but it either had been summarily rejected or ignored by each court in turn. See id.
at 400,445 S.E.2d at 903.
154. See id. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906. It should be noted that Baby Paul had been
physically united with his biological parents two and one-half years earlier when the
district judge ordered the child into their custody pending the appeal. See id. at 399, 445
S.E.2d at 902.
155. Id. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906. The court in Petersen also expressly disavowed any
conflicting language in Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 793, 407 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1991),
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the only parents Baby Paul had known for the first three years of his
life, became legal strangers to him because they lacked any biological
connection. Whether or not it was in Baby Paul's interest to continue
any relationship with them had become irrelevant. 56
B. Analysis of the Petersen Decision
Writing for the supreme court in Petersen, Justice Parker based
her analysis on two United States Supreme Court cases-Stanley v.
Illinois57 and Reno v. Flores'sm--that recognized some constitutional
protection for the parental rights of unwed biological fathers, 159 and
on her conclusion that "North Carolina's recognition of the
paramount right of parents to custody, care, and nurture of their
children antedates the constitutional protections set forth in Stanley
[in 1972].'161 It is arguable, however, that Supreme Court cases after
1972 do not compel the Petersen decision and that the decision is in
conflict with North Carolina case law prior to and after 1972. The
Petersen court's failure to explore Supreme Court cases other than
Stanley and Reno and the North Carolina polar star cases discussed in
Section I is perplexing. The phrase "polar star" appears nowhere in
Petersen, and the opinion does not mention or consider the meaning
or effect of § 50-13.2(a).
1. The United States Supreme Court's Position on the Rights of
Unwed Fathers
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a statute that
presumed unwed fathers unfit to raise their children was
unconstitutional.' Although the decision was a victory for the rights
of unwed fathers, Stanley arguably protected only "substantial
contact" between the unwed father and his child by providing
protection from termination of parental rights based on a
that "indicat[ed] that the statute changed the paramount right of parents." Petersen, 337
N.C. at 406,445 S.E.2d at 906.
156. By the time the supreme court made this pronouncement, Baby Paul had long
been in the custody of Rowe and Rogers in Michigan and the Petersens had not seen the
child in more than two and one-half years, making the practical impact of this decision a
bit more palatable.
157. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
158. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
159. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 400-02, 445 S.E.2d at 903-04 (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at
648-49, 651,657-58; Reno, 507 U.S. at 303-04).
160. Id. at 402, 445 S.E.2d at 904.
161. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
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presumption of unfitness.162 It did not mandate full custody and
control. 63 Subsequent Supreme Court cases also appear to limit the
validity of expansive interpretations of Stanley. In Lehr v.
Robertson,164 Caban v. Mohammed,65 and Quilloin v. Walcott,6 6 the
Court arguably limited the unwed biological father's constitutional
protection to cases in which he had established a significant parent-
child relationship. 67 Some commentators have labeled this limitation
a "biology-plus" test. 6s
Additional questions concerning the Supreme Court's
willingness to confer constitutional protection for unwed fathers were
raised in 1989 by Michael H. v. Gerald D.,169 in which the unwed
biological father's rights were subordinated to the husband of the
biological mother and the presumption of legitimacy. 7 The mother,
while married, had an affair and lived with the biological father.17'
When the child was born, the biological father lived with the mother
and helped care for the child until the mother took the child and
moved back in with her husband. 72 When the mother denied the
biological father visitation, he filed suit. 73 Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion denied constitutional protection for the biological father.174
Justice Brennan's dissent reiterated the biology-plus test, asserting
that an unwed father's biological link to a child is not constitutionally
protected unless combined with a substantial parent-child
162. See id. at 651.
163. See id. at 658; see also Jeffrey Thomas Skinner, Note, Why the Best Interests
Standard Should Survive Petersen v. Rogers, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2451, 2459 (1995) (noting
that the Stanley Court "did not adequately characterize 'substantial' contact, nor did it
indicate how to protect this interest").
164. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
165. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
166. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
167. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-62,266-67; Caban, 441 U.S. at 392-93; Quilloin, 434 U.S.
at 256.
168. See Scott A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the Rights of
Unwed Fathers in Newborn Adoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363, 385 (1996)
(identifying the "biology-plus" test and noting that to obtain constitutional protection for
his parental rights, an "unwed father must establish a positive and substantial relationship
with his child"); Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right
to Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 971, 975-77 (1992)
(describing the "biology-plus" test and how Quilloin indicated that an unwed father must
have a greater relationship than just a biological link with the child).
169. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
170. See id. at 119-27.
171. See id. at 113-14.
172. See id. at 114-15.
173. See id. at 114.




The Supreme Court's pronouncements since 1972 on the
constitutional protection of the parental rights of unwed fathers are
not definitive, but no Justice has argued for a lesser standard than
"biology-plus." The biology-plus standard appears to contradict the
Petersen interpretation of grounding constitutional protection on the
biological link alone. Additionally, the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed adoption cases in which the illegitimate child is released
for adoption at or near birth with no opportunity for the biological
parent to establish any relationship with the child.
This qualification of the Supreme Court's parental rights
jurisprudence is also apparent in the language of Reno,76 quoted by
the Petersen court, where it is clear that the Supreme Court was
referring to a situation in which the parent or parents already had
custody of the child. In the Reno passage quoted in Petersen, the
Supreme Court asserted that even if potential adoptive parents could
prove that they could best provide for the child's welfare, the child
would not be removed from the custody of its biological parents " 'so
long as they were providing for the child adequately.' ,,177 The Court
concluded that the best interest of the child is not the sole traditional
or constitutional criterion that determines custody matters other than
custody decisions between two parents 7 8s--but only if minimum
standards of child care are observed can " 'the interests of the child
175. See id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 570
(1996) (holding that conditioning the mother's civil appeal of the trial court's termination
of her parental rights on her ability to pay for preparation of the appellate record violated
due process and equal protection). The Court in M.L.B. stated that the parental
relationship is an interest "'far more precious than any property right.' " Id. at 565
(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982)). One commentator has noted
that the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in the Baby Jessica case, In re B.C.G.,
496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992), shows the Court's continued unwillingness to consider the
parental rights of an unwed father when "he has not yet had an opportunity to develop a
relationship" with that child. Resnik, supra note 168, at 389. This commentator attributes
this hesitancy "to a traditional and implicit understanding that the regulation of family
matters is, whenever possible, better effectuated at the state level." Id.
176. In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a federal regulation which allowed the government to detain alien
juveniles pending deportation hearings when no parents, adult relatives, or legal
guardians were available. See id. at 315. The Court held that a detained juvenile lacked a
constitutional right to a hearing to determine whether release to another responsible
adult was in the child's best interest. See id. 303-05; see also Gail Quick Goeke, Note,
Substantive and Procedural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles, 60 Mo. L.
REV. 221, 227-33 (1995) (discussing Reno).
177. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 401,445 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
304 (1993)).
178. See id. at 401,445 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 303-04).
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•.. be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even
to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves.' ,179 Thus, the
language from Reno cited in Petersen does not adopt the analysis
apparently attributed to it by the Petersen court, namely that the
Constitution deems the best interest of the child irrelevant when the
fit biological parent seeks custody from a third party who has cared
for the child since birth.
2. North Carolina Law on the Rights of Unwed Fathers
In Petersen, Justice Parker stated that the North Carolina
Supreme Court "has repeatedly emphasized the strength and
importance" of the paramount right of parents to the custody and
care of their children.' Whether Justice Parker correctly stated the
court's prior approach is debatable. Arguably, the supreme court
had not applied the Petersen analysis in the prior 100 years. As
discussed in Part I, an ample number of North Carolina cases de-
emphasize the strength of the natural parents' right to custody,
establish the welfare of the child as the polar star in all custody cases,
and give custody to third parties without any finding that the natural
parent is unfit.'81 The court in Petersen did not discuss or cite these
cases.
Instead, Justice Parker cited just two cases, Jolly v. Queen132 and
In re Custody of Hughes,a8 3 in support of the majority's contention.
Yet even these cases fail to support the Petersen analysis. One of the
cases, Jolly, is clearly not on point. In Jolly, the court did not hold
that an unwed biological father had a paramount right to custody,
absent unfitness, as against a third party. Instead, it held that the
mother of an illegitimate child had the legal right to custody as
against the unwed biological father absent a finding of unfitness of
the mother or legitimation by the father.' 84 The Jolly court noted that
at common law the right to custody of a legitimate child was the
father's and not the mother's, but as b'etween a putative father and
mother of illegitimate children, the mother's right of custody was
superior. 5  Thus, Jolly had more to do with attitudes toward
179. Id. at 402,445 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 304).
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 27-108 and accompanying text.
182. 264 N.C. 711,142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).
183. 254 N.C. 434, 119 S.E.2d 189 (1961).
184. See Jolly, 264 N.C. at 714, 142 S.E.2d at 595.
185. See id. (citing B. Finberg, Annotation, Right of Mother to Custody of Illegitimate
Child, 98 A.L.R.2D 417, 431 (1964)).
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illegitimacy than with the rights of unwed biological fathers."8 6
Similarly, the other case relied on by Justice Parker-In re Custody
of Hughes-provides only weak support for the majority's
proposition. Although the Hughes court did award custody to the
grandmother upon a finding that the mother was unfit, the opinion
clearly indicated that parental unfitness was just one way of denying
custody to the parent-not the only way, as the Petersen court
claimed.' 7
Also unaddressed by the Petersen opinion is the legislature's
apparent adoption in § 50-13.2(a) of the polar star line of cases and
the best interest test for all custody cases. A legislative requirement
that courts base all custody decisions upon the best interest of the
child is supported not only by the plain language of the statute but
also by the supreme court's 1997 opinion in Price v. Howard.' In
Petersen, however, the court held that the trial judge was not
authorized to conduct a best interest inquiry into custody of Baby
Paul.189 Thus, it appears that the court in Petersen assumed that § 50-
13.2(a) was unconstitutional as applied to custody disputes between
natural parents and third parties. 90
3. Standing to Bring Custody or Visitation Actions
The polar star cases provide no indication that a third party
seeking custody against the natural parent lacks standing to bring the
action simply because the third party is unrelated to the child. For
186. See id.; see also Finley v. Sapp, 238 N.C. 114, 116-17, 76 S.E.2d 350, 352 (1953)
(holding that in a custody battle between the husband and wife, the natural right of the
father to custody did not limit the discretionary power of the court to award custody
based upon the best interest and general welfare of the child); Clegg v. Clegg, 186 N.C.
28, 36-40, 118 S.E. 824, 827-30 (1923) (relying on the best interest and polar star
principles to overcome the husband's common law paramount interest and to award the
wife visitation). Clegg, Finley, and Jolly were all cases involving custody battles between
parents that were complicated by issues of legitimacy and of old common law irrebuttable
presumptions. In each case, the court abandoned or sought to weaken the old common
law irrebuttable presumptions in favor of a rebuttable presumption/balancing/best
interest test, which appears to have been the clear trend in the North Carolina courts until
Petersen.
187. See Hughes, 254 N.C. at 436-37, 119 S.E.2d at 191 (referring to and quoting In re
Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957)).
188. 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997). In Price, the court clearly stated the statutory
requirement: "As in North Carolina, New York statutes required courts to base custody
decisions solely upon the best interest of the child." Id. at 81, 484 S.E.2d at 535 (citing
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 282 (N.Y. 1976)); see also infra notes 281-98 and
accompanying text (discussing Price).
189. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 404,445 S.E.2d at 905-06.
190. See id. at 403-04,445 S.E.2d at 905.
1998] 2175
2176 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
instance, in In re Gibbons, the Brights were biologically unrelated to
the child, but the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that their
substantial historical relationship could justify their custody claim
over a fit father.91 Additionally, the clear language of § 50-13.1
provides standing to both relatives and other persons, and the case
law indicates that the statute was intended to codify the existing law
and to confer a broad grant of standing in custody cases.192 Yet
Petersen expressly held that § 50-13.1 "was not intended to confer
upon strangers the right to bring custody or visitation actions against
parents of children unrelated to such strangers."'193
In Petersen, the court mentioned only two bases for its
interpretation of § 50-13.1. First, the court agreed with the reasoning
of the trial court in Ray v. Ray'94 that a literal interpretation of the
"other person" language in § 50-13.1 "'would nullify any need for
§ 50-13.2(bl) and § 50-13.2A, neither of which [has] been
repealed.' "195 Second, the supreme court asserted that a literal
interpretation of the "other person" language in § 50-13.1 "would
191. See In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. at 279-80, 101 S.E.2d at 21-22; supra notes 55-63 and
accompanying text (discussing Gibbons).
192. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1995)).
193. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906 (analyzing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1
(1995)).
194. 103 N.C. App. 790,407 S.E.2d 592 (1991).
195. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405-06, 445 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Ray, 103 N.C. App. at
792, 407 S.E.2d at 593) (alteration in original). North Carolina General Statutes § 50-
13.2(bl) (Supp. 1997) provides that:
An order for custody of a minor child may provide visitation rights for any
grandparent of the child as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. As
used in this subsection, "grandparent" includes a biological grandparent of a
child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial
relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no
circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive
parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both
biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights.
Id. North Carolina General Statutes § 50-13.2A (1995) provides that:
A biological grandparent may institute an action or proceeding for
visitation rights with a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child
where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child.
Under no circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by
adoptive parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental
rights of both biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation
rights. A court may award visitation rights if it determines that visitation is in
the best interest of the child. An order awarding visitation rights shall contain
findings of fact which support the determination by the judge of the best interest
of the child. Procedure, venue, and jurisdiction shall be as in an action for
custody.
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conflict with the constitutionally-protected paramount right of
parents to custody, care, and control of their children." '196
Regarding the first basis, it is reasonable to conclude, as the
North Carolina Court of Appeals did in Ray, that the "[o]ther
statutes which allow actions for visitation (i.e. N.C.G.S. §§ 50-13.2A,
50-13.2(bl) and 50-13.56)) are merely supplemental.... [and] do not
in any way contradict § N.C.G.S. 50-13.1(a). 197 Both § 50-13.2(bl)
and § 50-13.2A concern only visitation for grandparents in certain
limited situations. At the time the last two sentences of § 50-13.2(bl)
were added in 1985198 and § 50-13.2A was adopted, 199 § 50-13.1(a)
conferred standing only to bring "an action or proceeding for ...
custody" and did not clearly pertain to actions for visitation."0 In
1989, the General Assembly resolved this matter by adding a second
sentence to § 50-13.1(a) to provide that "custody" means "custody or
visitation or both. '2 1 It is difficult to agree with the conclusion in
Petersen that the unambiguous language of § 50-13.1(a) broadly
granting standing to "[a]ny parent, relative, or other person" to bring
custody actions is subject to reinterpretation, given that § 50-13.2(bl)
and § 50-13.2A were adopted to address visitation rights of
grandparents and that § 50-13.1(a) originally did not grant standing to
anyone to bring visitation actions.
Furthermore, even if § 50-13.1(a) had clearly given parents,
relatives, and other persons standing to bring both custody and
visitation actions when § 50-13.2(bl) and § 50-13.2A were adopted,
the effect of § 50-13.2(bl) and § 50-13.2A, consistent with the court's
holding in Oxendine v. Catawba County Department of Social
Services,2°2 is only to limit the applicability of the broad grant of
196. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406,445 S.E.2d at 906.
197. Ray, 103 N.C. App. at 793,407 S.E.2d at 593.
198. See Act of July 3, 1985, ch. 575, § 3, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 660, 660 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(bl) (Supp. 1997)). The last two sentences of North Carolina
General Statutes § 50-13.2(bl) read as follows:
As used in this subsection, "grandparent" includes a biological grandparent of a
child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial
relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no
circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive
parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both
biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights.
Id.
199. See Act of July 3, 1985, ch. 575, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 660, 660 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2A (1995)).
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1984) (emphasis added).
201. See Act of Aug. 12, 1989, ch. 795, § 15(b), 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 2912, 2916-17
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(a) (1995)).
202. 303 N.C. 699,281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).
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standing of § 50-13.1(a) in cases involving grandparent actions for
visitation, and not in those situations not expressly addressed in § 50-
13.2(bl) and § 50-13.2A. °3 Under Oxendine, § 50-13.1(a) is subject
to other, more specific statutes that expressly limit or condition
standing in certain situations or for certain categories of plaintiffs.",
The limitations on § 50-13.1(a) standing created by § 50-13.2(bl) and
§ 50-13.2A are only limitations on the use of § 50-13.1 by those
persons to whom the more specific statutes apply-foster parents in
Oxendine and grandparents in the case of § 50-13.2(bl) and § 50-
13.2A. The more specific statutes do not limit the broad grant of
standing of § 50-13.1 to those "other persons" not expressly provided
for in the more specific statutes. As to those, § 50-13.1(a) must still
be held to mean what it clearly says. 05
The second basis offered by the Petersen court is also inadequate
to support a reinterpretation. The court's claim that a literal
interpretation of § 50-13.1 "would conflict with the constitutionally-
protected paramount right of parents to custody '2 6 may be a basis
for holding the statute unconstitutional, but it is not a basis for
reinterpreting an unambiguous statute.207 As discussed in Part IV.B.,
this conclusion is dicta by the court that may not stand up to the
rigorous analysis expected if the constitutionality of § 50-13.1(a) and
§ 50-13.2(a) is directly at issue and expressly addressed.
The importance of this issue is not obvious initially because of its
placement toward the end in the Petersen opinion.20  But, if the
language used in Petersen is indeed controlling-that § 50-13.1 "was
not intended to confer upon strangers the right to bring custody or
visitation actions against parents of children unrelated to such
strangers" 209 then it would appear that the Petersens, as biological
203. See id. at 705-06, 281 S.E.2d at 374-75.
204. See id. at 707, 281 S.E.2d at 375.
205. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 634, 461 S.E.2d 745, 749 (1995); infra
notes 337-46 and accompanying text (discussing McIntyre).
206. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406,445 S.E.2d at 906.
207. See Yates v. Dowless, 93 N.C. App. 787, 788, 379 S.E.2d 79, 80 (1989) (" 'When
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial
construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are
without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained
therein.'" (quoting In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978))); see
also Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1956 (1998), (noting
that the doctrine of constitutional doubt, which requires the Court to interpret statutes to
avoid "'grave and constitutional questions,' " applies only "'where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions' " (quoting United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909))).




strangers to the child, were themselves not authorized to bring their
custody action after the adoption was nullified. Even without
concluding that such a result is constitutionally required, Petersenimplied that by adopting § 50-13.1, the General Assembly intended to
prevent all unrelated parties from ever seeking custody, even if
lengthy de facto custody of the child with the third parties had clearly
created a psychological family. If this is indeed the law, unrelated
third parties like the Petersens210 may be deprived of any opportunity
to raise the issues of the natural parent's fitness or suitability or the
best interest of the child.
IV. AFTER PETERSEN: LIMITATIONS ON THE PARAMOUNT RIGHT?
Although the Petersen court's focus on the biological link may
appear overly simplistic and too absolute when applied to certain
situations,21' there are arguable benefits from the decision. For
instance, although it took almost six years to resolve the custody of
Baby Paul, in similar cases after Petersen, the custody issue may often
be resolved more promptly. After Petersen, prospective adoptive
parents will be discouraged from prolonging litigation in the hopes
that their continued custody of the child during litigation will tilt the
best interest of the child determination in their favor because there is
no longer any best interest determination.212
Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned with the broad
impact of the basic holding in Petersen-that absent a finding that
parents either are unfit or have neglected the welfare of their
children, "the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents
to custody, care, and control of their children must prevail. 2 13 This
rule allows no exceptions for situations in which the child has spent
several years in the custody of third parties with whom the child has
formed significant emotional attachment and where the biological
parents are, in fact, practically strangers to the child. Thus, in certain
210. Or Stacy Price in Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997), discussed
infra at notes 281-98 and accompanying text. See also infra note 367 (discussing Ellison v.
Ramos, 1998 WL 436057, No. COA97-1417, at *1 (N.C. App. Aug. 4,1998)).
211. See infra notes 217-280 (citing cases where this may occur).
212. The best interest test appears to intrinsically favor the status quo, i.e., to reward
the one who can successfully care for the child in the years or months preceding the
hearing. Because custody is sometimes gained through the misbehavior or wrongdoing of
the custodians or through significant mistreatment of the rights of the natural parents,
application of the true best interest test, which would ignore the guilt or the rights of the
parties, appears to encourage any behavior, even if improper, that would result in custody
or lengthen the time in custody prior to the hearing.
213. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403-04, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
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circumstances, Petersen can require the trial judge to disregard the
child's special "sense of time" and basic need for continuity of
relationships and surroundings necessary for normal development.214
As one commentator has noted, "the psychological well-being of a
child is ... enhanced when the continuity of some emotional
attachment or bonding to an adult or caretaker is maintained. 215
Responding in part to this inflexibility, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals has considered ways to limit or distinguish the holding in
Petersen, thus answering questions arguably left unresolved in
Petersen.
A. Will Petersen Apply Only to Intact Families?216
In the dissenting opinion in Lambert v. Riddick,21 7 Judge Greene
argued for a narrow interpretation of Petersen analogous to the
United States Supreme Court's biology-plus requirement.
Although acknowledging Petersen's "broad language" describing
parents' rights to the custody of their children, Judge Greene
asserted that Petersen requires proof of parental unfitness to
overcome the parent's right only when the other party seeks to break
up an existing family unit.219 He cited Supreme Court decisions that
used the same requirement."0 Judge Greene contrasted this situation
with those in which the contestants are parents without legal custody
214. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 42 (discussing the need to consider a
child's "sense of time" in placement decisions). Incorporating a child's sense of time into
a best interest framework would require decisionmakers to act quickly to restore stability
and to limit the loss and uncertainty in the child's life. See CHILDREN AND THE LAW: A
CASEBOOK FOR PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 4.
215. CHILDREN AND THE LAW: A CASEBOOK FOR PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 4.
216. Intact families are those living together with the child at the time of the custody
trial or families from which the child has been removed unlawfully. See infra note 223
and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes an intact family).
217. 120 N.C. App. 480,462 S.E.2d 835 (1995).
218. See supra notes 164-75 and accompanying text (discussing the "biology-plus"
test).
219. See Lambert, 120 N.C. App. at 483-84, 462 S.E.2d at 837 (Greene, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 483, 462 S.E.2d at 837 (Greene, J., dissenting) (citing Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (stating that parental unfitness is required to remove a child
from the custody of her parents); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (indicating
that due process likely would be violated if a state attempted to break up a natural family
absent unfitness)). Judge Greene also cited two North Carolina Supreme Court cases,
McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 633-35, 461 S.E.2d 745, 749-50 (1995) (stating that
grandparents seeking visitation with children in an intact family must show parental
unfitness) and Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405-06, 445 S.E.2d at 906 (1994) (stating the principle
that parents with legal custody of their children should be protected from the claims of
others), to support his argument. See Lambert, 120 N.C. App. at 483-84, 462 S.E.2d at 837
(Greene, J., dissenting).
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and third parties have physical custody of the child." In these
situations, he said, the standard is the best interest of the child.'
Accordingly, on the facts of Lambert, Judge Greene concluded that
there was no intact family and that the father seeking custody had
allowed the child to live with the third party contestant,
consequently, he would have decided the case under the best
interests of the child standard.'
In Petersen, however, the natural parents had never lived with
their child in "an intact family unit." 4 Petersen could have specified
that the constitutional paramount right applied only to intact
families22 or to families that would have been intact except for the
illegal acts of third parties226 because the determination that the
Petersens illegally bought Baby Paul would have sufficed. The court
noted no such limitation. Rather, Petersen's directive was simple and
inescapable: In a custody proceeding, a fit natural parent not found
to have neglected the child has a right to custody superior to third
persons. 7  Thus, the natural parent's constitutionally-based
paramount right to custody as defined in Petersen is not dependent,
as Judge Greene argued, on the existence of a "family unit."
221. See Lambert, 120 N.C. App. at 484,462 S.E.2d at 837 (Greene, J., dissenting).
222 See id. (Greene, J., dissenting) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a)).
223. See id. at 484-85, 462 S.E.2d at 837 (Greene, J., dissenting) (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.2(a)); see also Fisher v. Gaydon, 124 N.C. App. 442, 445, 477 S.E.2d 251,
253 (1996) (stating that a single parent living with her children can constitute an intact
family) (note that this is the case name as it appears in the North Carolina Reporter; it is
entitled Fisher v. Fisher in the South Eastern Reporter), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 640,
483 S.E.2d 706 (1997); Price v. Howard, 122 N.C. App. 674, 677-78, 471 S.E.2d 673, 675
(Greene, J., dissenting) (stating that Petersen protects only intact families), rev'd, 346
N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1996); Bivens v. Cottle, 120 N.C. App. 467, 470, 462 S.E.2d 829,
831-32 (1995) (Greene, J., concurring in the result) (stating that the Petersen parental
preference rule does not extend to a parent not living with the child in an intact family
unit), appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 270, 270, 485 S.E.2d 296, 296 (1997). But see Bivens, 120
N.C. App. at 469-70, 462 S.E.2d at 831 (rejecting in particular Judge Greene's
interpretation of Petersen).
224. See In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329 N.C. 692, 697, 407 S.E.2d 505, 508 (1991)
(noting that the natural parents immediately gave the child away after his birth).
225. Cf. McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 635, 461 S.E.2d at 750 (stating that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.1(a) does not allow grandparents to sue for visitation with children living in an
intact family).
226. See Price, 122 N.C. App. at 677, 471 S.E.2d at 675 (Greene, J., dissenting);
Lambert, 120 N.C. App. at 484,462 S.E.2d at 837 (Greene, J., dissenting).
227. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403-04,445 S.E.2d at 905.
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B. Under Petersen, What Set of Facts Will Be Sufficient to Prove That
a Parent Is Unfit or Has Neglected the Child's Welfare?
In Raynor v. Odom, the custody contest between a mother and
the grandmother was won by the grandmother based on the
conclusion that the mother was unfit to have custody of the minor
child. 9 The mother appealed, arguing that the findings of fact did
not support the conclusion of law that she was unfit 30 After first
noting that no appellate decision had defined with precision the
findings necessary to establish a natural parent's unfitness under
Petersen, the Raynor court held that, in any event, appellate review
should be de novo and that a court should consider "the totality of
the circumstances."' 31
The trial court in Raynor based its determination that the
mother was unfit on a variety of facts, some of which appeared to be
more directly related to the child's best interest than to the mother's
fitness as a parent. For instance, the trial court found as fact that: (1)
the grandmother had properly arranged for medical treatment of the
child;' (2) the child had special treatment needs;233 and (3) " 'the fact
that the child was not as advanced or mature as many of his
contemporaries as indicated by the pre-school screening indicates
that plaintiff was not providing for the child the motivation,
opportunity and encouragement for normal and healthy
development.' "I Additionally, the trial court found that: (1) the
mother had been found in contempt of court for "failing to submit to
a timely drug screening and substance abuse counseling," 5 "failing
to complete and submit to a home study,' ' 36 and "failing to authorize
the release of her military and medical records"; 237 (2) the mother
suffered blackouts and had a quick temper;238 (3) the mother had
DWI convictions; 9 (4) the mother's "willful violation of the court's
orders indicate[d] a lack of respect for authority that could be
imparted upon the child, and indicate[d] a lack of sincere desire to
228. 124 N.C. App. 724,478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).
229. See id. at 727, 478 S.E.2d at 657.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 731, 478 S.E.2d at 659.
232. See id. at 729-30, 478 S.E.2d at 658.
233. See id. at 729-30, 478 S.E.2d at 658-59.
234. Id. at 730, 478 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting the trial court's findings of fact).
235. Id. at 731-32,478 S.E.2d at 659.
236. Id. at 732, 478 S.E.2d at 659.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 731, 478 S.E.2d at 659.
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have custody of the child";24 (5) the mother's "failure to visit the
child unless [the grandmother] provide[d] transportation indicate[d]
a lack of true concern for the child";241 (6) the mother "had been
openly hostile and rude to [the grandmother]"; 242 and (7) the mother
"failed to provide [the grandmother] with information concerning the
child's medical insurance." 243 In rejecting the mother's appeal, the
court of appeals held that such findings "paint a picture of a person
who has had substance abuse problems, does not respect authority, is
unable to recognize her child's developmental problems, and is
incapable of caring for the child's welfare," providing "ample support
for the legal conclusion that plaintiff is an unfit parent."2'
While the court of appeals in Raynor expressly agreed that the
socioeconomic status of the grandmother was irrelevant to the fitness
determination of the mother,245 it approved the use of other evidence
generally associated with the best interest of the child standard.246 To
the extent that evidence of the special needs of the child, the special
relationship with the third party, and various negative aspects of the
parent's character or life are allowed as sufficiently related to the
parent's fitness as a parent, then the fitness test may be broad enough
to allow at least indirect consideration of the child's best interest by
the trial judge.247
C. Will Petersen Apply Only to Initial Custody Decisions?
In Bivens v. Cottle,2" the district court had entered a pre-
Petersen decree in 1992 awarding custody to the maternal
grandparents despite expressly finding that the mother was a fit
parent.249 Following the Petersen opinion in 1994, the mother filed a
240. Id. at 732, 478 S.E.2d at 659-60.




245. See id. at 731, 478 S.E.2d at 659.
246. See id. at 731-32.
247. See id. at 730-32; see also Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357, 360, 477 S.E.2d 258,
260 (1996) (noting that in custody suits between parents, the standard is the best interest
of the child, but between parents and grandparents, the parent must be found to be unfit).
In Sharp, the grandparents alleged that the mother had not provided a suitable home and
that the father had been uninvolved, see id. at 361, 477 S.E.2d at 260, and the court stated
that the best interest of the children required a hearing on parental fitness, see id. at 361,
363, 477 S.E.2d at 261.
248. 120 N.C. App. 467,462 S.E.2d 829 (1995).
249. See id. at 468,462 S.E.2d at 830.
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motion to modify the custody order." The mother argued that the
best interest inquiry at the first hearing was improper and that she
was entitled to custody without the necessity of showing any change
of circumstance.25' The trial judge agreed and awarded custody to the
mother without conducting a hearing on changed circumstances1 2
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the statutory
procedure for a change of a custody order requires that there be "a
substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child"
and that the proposed change be "in the best interest of the child."''z3
The court noted that state law provides "no exceptions ... to the
requirement that a change in circumstances be shown before a
custody decree may be modified." 4 Having failed to appeal the 1992
custody order on Petersen grounds, the mother instead sought to
apply the Petersen standard to the modification proceeding.255 The
court held that Petersen applied only to the initial custody
determination and not to modifications.26 The North Carolina
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the matter, but
subsequently ruled that discretionary review had been improvidently
granted and allowed the decision of the court of appeals to stand.z 7
D. Will the Inaction of a Parent or Other Equitable Consideration Be
Sufficient to Waive or Overcome the Paramount Right?258
It remains to be seen how tolerant the courts will be with regard
to biological parents who do not quickly, effectively, or successfully
enforce their paramount right to custody or to a significant




253. Id. at 469, 462 S.E.2d at 831.
254. Id. (referring to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(a) (1987)).
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See Bivens v. Cottle, 346 N.C. 270, 270, 485 S.E.2d 296, 296 (1997); see also
Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724,733-34,478 S.E.2d 655,660-61 (1996) (holding that a
determination that the parent was unfit was enough of a change of circumstances to
warrant a modification of custody under the change of custody statute, § 50-13.7 (1995));
Speaks v. Fanek, 122 N.C. App. 389, 390, 470 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1996) (stating a narrow
interpretation of Petersen and applying it to initial custody determinations only, not to
consideration of change in a custody order "based on changed circumstances"); Lambert
v. Riddick, 120 N.C. App. 480, 483, 462 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1995) (holding that the trial
court's award of custody to a third party found to be fit and proper applied an improper
standard in determining custody between the biological father and a third party).
258. Others with arguably protectable interests include spouses, step-spouses,
grandparents, and psychological parents.
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proceedings to enforce his right within months of Baby Paul's birth.259
At some point, however, the courts may conclude that a biological
father did not do enough to enforce his paramount right and
therefore waived the right or was barred by laches or by his inaction
had neglected the welfare of the child.26 North Carolina cases do not
appear to have explored this equitable approach to third-party
custody disputes, but other jurisdictions have recognized the
applicability of equitable principles and the possibility of equitable
parenthood. 26 1 For instance, if the natural mother falsely represented
that a third party was the natural father, intending for the third party
to rely on the representation and the third party did so rely, the court
might equitably estop the mother from asserting that the third party
was not the father and find that the third party was an equitable
parent with corresponding rights.262
The court of appeals found another creative way to support a de
facto parent263 in Jones v. Patience.2 4 In Jones., the North Carolina
Court of Appeals protected a de facto father's custody interest
because he was also the husband of the mother at the birth of the
259. See In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329 N.C. 692,694,407 S.E.2d 505,506 (1991).
260. See infra note 382 and accompanying text.
261. For instance, in Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997), the elements
of equitable estoppel-false representation or concealment of material fact, intention that
the representation or concealment be acted upon, and actual reliance-were present. See
id. at 70-71, 484 S.E.2d at 529-30. In some states, courts have found such facts to justify a
finding of equitable parenthood. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court implied that
equitable parenthood could be established by a man because he was married to the child's
mother at the time of conception, he reasonably believed that he was the child's father,
and he had established a parental relationship with the child, with the additional factor
that a parental relationship with him may be in the child's best interest. See In re
Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 480 (Iowa 1995). The Michigan Supreme Court
also upheld the equitable parent doctrine involving the mother's husband-who was not
the biological father-when both the equitable parent and the child acknowledged the
relationship and the mother had cooperated in the development of that relationship. See
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. 1987). The South Dakota Supreme
Court said, however, that such equitable relief may not be available to a third party who
has no legal relationship to the child but is simply an interested third party who at one
time lived with the mother, was sole caretaker of the child for several years, and who
cared for the child. See D.G. v. D.M.K., 557 N.W.2d 235,242-43 (S.D. 1996).
262. See supra note 261 (discussing cases applying the equitable parent doctrine).
263. See supra note 19 (discussing the de facto parent concept).
264. 121 N.C. App. 434, 466 S.E.2d 720, disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 307, 471 S.E.2d
72 (1996). See generally Alan Stephens, Annotation, Parental Rights of Man Who Is Not
Biological or Adoptive Father of Child But Was Husband or Cohabitant of Mother When
Child Was Conceived or Born, 84 A.L.R.4TH 655, 679-84 (1991) (discussing cases in which
"[t]he presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock was applied... to protect
the parental rights of a husband who was shown not to be the child's biological father").
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child.265 The couple was married in 1981, and the child was born in
1989.266 They lived together as a family until late 1991, when the
couple separated.267 Until early 1992, the husband believed he was
the biological father of the child.26 He had been at the mother's side
during the birth of the child, he was involved in the daily care and
nurture of the child, and he had continued his relationship with the
child after the separation.269 In early 1992, when the child was two
and one-half years old, the mother told her husband that he was not
the father and terminated his visits with the child.2 0 The husband
filed suit seeking visitation,27 but voluntary blood tests excluded him
as the biological father.272 In a pre-Petersen decision, the trial court
allowed the husband visitation with the child, using the best interest
standard. 73
On appeal, however, the mother argued that awarding visitation
rights to her former husband, whom the trial court had found was not
the biological father, in the absence of a finding that she was unfit to
have custody of the child, violated Petersen. 4 Bothered by a result
that would exclude even visitation between the toddler and her
psychological father, the court of appeals finessed Petersen by
holding that the marital presumption (that is, that the husband is the
father of a child born to the wife during the marriage) had not been
rebutted in this case despite the trial court's finding that the plaintiff
was not the biological father.275 The court of appeals held that the
presumption could be rebutted only if "another man has formally
acknowledged paternity ... or has been adjudicated to be the father
of the child. 27 6  This method of avoiding the consequences of
Petersen will not, however, necessarily help the husband in the long
run because the biological father could come forward, acknowledge
paternity, and possibly rebut the presumption that permitted the
husband visitation.2 "
265. See Jones, 121 N.C. App. at 440,466 S.E.2d at 723.





271. See id. at 436-37, 466 S.E.2d at 721.
272 See id at 437, 466 S.E.2d at 721.
273. See id. at 437, 466 S.E.2d at 722. In a 1994 review hearing, the trial court found
that he had not missed a scheduled visitation in the preceding twelve months. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 439-40, 466 S.E.2d at 723.
276. Id. at 439,466 S.E.2d at 723.
277. A related question involves whether or not an alleged biological father can
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Despite the supreme court's ruling in McIntyre v. Mclntyre2 7s
that grandparents may not bring an independent action for visitation
except as allowed by § 50-13.2A and § 50-13.5(j), 279 the court of
appeals has stated that grandparents may bring an initial suit for
custody so long as they allege the parents' unfitness and overcome
the constitutionally protected paramount right of parents established
in Petersen.80 It appears that the compelling facts of certain cases
involving particularly sympathetic spouses, grandparents, or other
psychological parents will continue to motivate the appellate courts
to search for exceptions to the Petersen fiat.
V. PRICE V. HOWARD AND REVISITING THE PETERSEN STANDARD
A. A Psychological Parent
Several years after Petersen, the North Carolina Supreme Court
heard another difficult child custody case. In Price v. Howard,."8
Stacy Price and Robin Howard lived together from 1985 until 1989
but never married. 2 Howard had a child in 1986, and from the time
of birth, Price held out the child as his biological daughter and the
child believed he was her biological father.3 Price and Howard
separated in 1989, with Price remaining an equal caretaker of the
compel the mother, her husband, and the child to submit to blood tests in order to
establish the alleged biological father's paternity. Such questions force the courts to
wrestle with the paramount right of biological parents as proclaimed by Petersen,
balanced against the law's preference for legitimacy and the integrity of the family, "the
seminal unit of society as we know it." State v. White, 300 N.C. 494, 508, 268 S.E.2d 481,
490 (1980). These issues are discussed at length in the majority opinion and dissent in a
case in which the blood test was allowed. See Johnson v. Johnson, 120 N.C. App. 1, 461
S.E.2d 369 (1995), rev'd, 343 N.C. 114, 468 S.E.2d 59 (1996). On appeal, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals, agreeing with the dissent of the court of appeals that
the alleged natural parent lacked standing to compel the presumed father (the mother's
husband) to submit to a blood test to determine paternity of the child born during the
marriage. See Johnson v. Johnson, 343 N.C. 114,114-15,468 S.E.2d 59,59-60 (1996).
278. 341 N.C. 629,461 S.E.2d 745 (1995).
279. See id. at 633-35, 461 S.E.2d at 748-50; see also Fisher v. Gaydon, 124 N.C. App.
442, 444, 477 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1996) (holding that it followed from McIntyre that "under
the broad grant of section 50-13.1(a), grandparents have standing to seek visitation with
their grandchildren when those children are not living in a McIntyre 'intact family' "
(quoting McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 634, 461 S.E.2d at 749)) (note that this is the case name as
it appears in the North Carolina Reporter; it is entitled Fisher v. Fisher in the South
Eastern Reporter)), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 640, 483 S.E.2d 706 (1997).
280. See Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357,359-61,477 S.E.2d 258,259-61 (1996).
281. 122 N.C. App. 674, 471 S.E.2d 673 (1996), rev'd, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528
(1997).
282. See id.
283. See id. at 674-75, 471 S.E.2d at 673.
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child and at times the primary caretaker.2 4 When Howard moved to
Eden, North Carolina in 1991, the child remained with Price in
Durham.25 Price sought sole custody of the child the following year,
at which time Howard denied that Price was the child's biological
father.26 A court-ordered paternity test confirmed that Price was not
the father.2 After a hearing in 1995 (when the child was nine), the
trial court entered its final order in the action, concluding that
although both Howard and Price were fit to exercise exclusive care
and custody of the child, it was in the child's best interest to remain in
the primary physical custody of Price.28 Nevertheless, the trial court
concluded that Petersen did not allow an award of custody to Price
because Price was not the biological father and there was no evidence
Howard was an unfit mother or had neglected the child.289 The trial
court awarded Howard the exclusive care, custody, and control of the
child.290
Relying on Petersen, the court of appeals upheld the trial court,
finding that in a custody dispute between a natural parent and a third
party-even one who receives a minor child into his home and openly
holds out that child as his biological child-the natural parent is
entitled to custody as long as she is fit, and the "best interest of the
child" standard is not considered.291 Because Howard was entitled, as
the natural parent, to the exclusive custody and control of the child,
Price was left with no right to visitation or standing to seek visitation
with the child.292 As a result, Price, the undisputed psychological
father, appealed the determination that he might legally be prevented
from ever seeing the nine-year-old girl he considered his daughter. 3
Without purporting to overturn or modify Petersen, the North
Carolina Supreme Court found what had eluded the scrutiny of the
trial judge and the court of appeals panel: a third exception to the
natural parent's paramount right to custody. In Price, the supreme
court held that even if there is no showing of the natural parent's
unfitness or neglect, there may be "other circumstances" that require
the paramount right to yield to the best interest of the child




288. See id. at 675, 471 S.E.2d at 674.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 675-76, 471 S.E.2d at 674.
292. See id. at 676,471 S.E.2d at 674.
293. See Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68,70,484 S.E.2d 528,529 (1997).
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standard.29a The court held that conduct by the natural parent
inconsistent with the presumption that he or she will act in the best
interest of the child can be sufficient to withdraw the constitutional
protection normally due the natural parent's custody right.295 The
supreme court indicated that such inconsistent conduct would include
not only unfitness, neglect, and abandonment, but also other conduct
considered on a case-by-case basis 96 If inconsistent conduct is
shown, the analysis properly proceeds using the best interest of the
child test mandated by § 50-13.2(a).2 97 The matter was remanded to
the district court for a determination of whether the natural mother's
conduct-including her actions over several years that "created the
existing family unit that includes [Stacy Price] and the child, but not
herself"-was inconsistent with the constitutionally-protected status
of a natural parent.295
B. Analysis of the Price Decision
Price certainly modified Petersen and arguably has begun the
process by which North Carolina could effectively return to the law
as enunciated in the polar star line of cases discussed in Part 1.299
However, the court in Price was also careful not to admit any
modification of Petersen, leaving some question as to how Price
should be applied in subsequent cases.
Significant differences between Petersen and Price exist.
Petersen consistently referred to the natural parent's paramount
"right" to custody,30 0 while Price consistently refers to this "right" as
an "interest. 3 1  Petersen ignored § 50-13.2(a) and its express
mandate to apply a best interest of the child test to all custody
proceedings,3" while Price acknowledged that in § 50-13.2(a) the
"General Assembly has prescribed the standard to be applied in a
custody proceeding in North Carolina" and that it is a best interest of
the child test.30 3 Price found § 50-13.2 constitutional so long as it is
294. Id. at 72,79,484 S.E.2d at 530,534-55.
295. See id
296. See id.
297. See id at 84,484 S.E.2d at 537 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1995)).
298. Id. at 83,484 S.E.2d at 537.
299. See supra notes 38-77 and accompanying text (discussing the polar star line of
cases).
300. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 400-06, 445 S.E.2d at 903-06.
301. Price, 346 N.C. at 72-84,484 S.E.2d at 530-37.
302. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 399-406, 445 S.E.2d at 902-06.
303. Price, 346 N.C. at 72, 484 S.E.2d at 530 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13-2(a)
(1995 & Supp. 1997)).
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applied consistently with the conduct test as set out in the opinion;
presumably, § 50-13.2(a) is unconstitutional as applied to disputes
between a natural parent and a third party without first applying the
conduct test.3°4
Whereas the phrase "polar star" appears in neither Petersen nor
Price, Price does, unlike Petersen, cite some of the polar star line of
cases mentioned in Section I,35 and it acknowledges that "North
Carolina law traditionally has protected the interests of natural
parents in the companionship, custody, care, and control of their
children, with similar recognition that some facts and circumstances,
typically those created by the parent, may warrant abrogation of those
interests."3 6 Additionally, Price's constitutional analysis includes the
United States Supreme Court cases that were not mentioned in
Petersen, which indicate that a biological connection alone does not
mandate a constitutional entitlement of the natural parent to
custody.3° Finally, although the trial court in Price denied visitation
to the man the child thought was her father, the supreme court did
not discuss his standing, as a biological stranger under § 50-13.1, to
seek either visitation or custody.
A clear holding in Petersen, despite apparent claims to the
contrary in Price, was that in custody disputes between natural
parents and third parties, it is unconstitutional to determine custody
pursuant to a best interest test absent a finding that the natural
parent was either unfit or had neglected the child.0 s Price overruled
this holding by determining that there were indeed "other
circumstances" that could "require [the natural parent's
constitutionally-protected interest in custody] to yield to the 'best
interest of the child' test prescribed by N.C.G.S. § 50-13.2(a). '0 9
These other circumstances were instances of conduct of the natural
parent that were inconsistent with the parent-child relationship but
304. See id- at 79,484 S.E.2d at 534-35.
305. See id. at 75, 484 S.E.2d at 532 (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 153 S.E.2d
349 (1967); In re Gibbons 247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957)).
306. Id. (emphasis added).
307. See id. at 74-79,484 S.E.2d at 531-34; supra notes 161-79.
308. Although Petersen does not mention the best interest test mandated by § 50-
13.2(a), the trial court had applied the best interest test, and the court in Petersen
expressly stated that regardless of the best interest inquiry, "the trial court could not
award custody to anyone other than" the natural parents as a matter of law because there
was no showing of unfitness. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 404, 445 S.E.2d at 905. Despite this
language, the court in Price claimed that the Petersen court "did not discuss whether a
'best interest of the child' test violated" the natural parent's constitutional paramount
right. Price, 346 N.C. at 74,484 S.E.2d at 531.
309. Price, 346 N.C. at 72,484 S.E.2d at 530.
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that nevertheless did not amount to unfitness or neglect of the child.
The rule announced in Price effectively swallows the Petersen
rule. Unfitness and neglect of the child's welfare are no longer
independent grounds for avoiding the natural parent's paramount
right or interest. Instead, they are simply examples of the kind of
conduct that is inconsistent with that right or interest and sufficient to
overcome the paramount right. After Price, the sole basis for
overcoming the paramount right is inconsistent conduct of the
natural parent.
By focusing on the natural parent's conduct, as opposed to the
interest or welfare of the child, the Price rule initially appears to
confirm Petersen's rejection of the polar star cases. Indeed, Justice
Orr, writing for the court in Price, stated that the due process issue
was to be resolved by balancing only two interests: (1) the natural
parent's paramount interest in the custody of the child; and (2) "the
state's well-established interest in protecting the welfare of
children"-the parens patriae power.3 10 The child's own interest and
the interest of the members of an intact "psychological" family were
not deemed factors in this equation.1 Yet, Price's own formulation
310. Id.
311. It can reasonably be argued that due process should also protect the interests of
the child and the person in the role of parent in continuing an established psychological or
de facto family. Thus, Stacy Price might have argued that he had a constitutionally
protected right (under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) to
continue his de facto parent-child relationship with the little girl he thought was his
daughter. Dicta in several Supreme Court cases support this argument. For instance, in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), the
Court stated that "a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and
a child in his or her care" depends on "the intimacy of daily association," and that it "may
exist even in the absence of blood relationship." Id. at 844.
The cases cited in Price-Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)-also are not
inconsistent with the conclusion that constitutional protection (at least at levels beyond
termination of parental rights) is dependent not only on the biological connection, but
also on the day-to-day, emotional and custodial relationship that a child needs with an
adult-the relationship generally referred to as the parental relationship. See generally
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 98 (defining the role in the child's life of the
psychological parent-which may or may not be the biological parent). One student
commentator has argued that the "parental rights standard" based on biology is
unconstitutional because the parental relationship protected by Supreme Court decisions
is not based on biology. See Haynie, supra note 6, at 744. Likewise, the commentator
continued, the "parental presumption standard" is not constitutional because it means
that a third party could not "compet[e] equally for custody." Id. As a result, the
commentator concluded, the best interest standard is "most consistent with constitutional
mandate[s]" because it "focus[es] on the child's needs and welfare, [and] considers the
interest of all the parties to the dispute." Id. See also Thompson, supra note 4, at 572
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of the test expressly allows for indirect consideration of these other
interests if the natural parent's conduct helped to create those other
interests. In Price, the natural mother, Howard, had left the child
with Price, the putative father, thus "creat[ing] the existing family
unit" that included only Price and the little girl.312 In addition, even
though the mother knew Price was not the girl's father, she told the
child and others that he was the father.313 The supreme court also
thought it was important that there was some dispute as to whether
Howard intended to leave the girl with Price temporarily or
permanently.31 4 The court reasoned that if Howard had left her
daughter with Price without specifying that it was only temporary,
she would have "induced them to allow that family unit to flourish in
a relationship of love and duty with no expectations that it would be
terminated. 315
Under Price, then, the existence of a de facto or psychological
parent-child relationship must be considered by the trial court in
evaluating the natural parent's paramount right to custody, because
in most cases the conduct of the natural parents will have contributed
to the creation of the de facto relationship. Such conduct may be
inconsistent with the natural parent's paramount interest in
custody.316  Thus, evidence of the child's interest and welfare,
although not the ultimate focus of the Price test, is nevertheless
relevant to evaluate the parent's conduct.
The legal analysis in Price supports the conclusion that the
supreme court intends the inconsistent conduct test to allow
("The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution has been read by the
Court to allow the use of the best-interests standard to award custody to a non-parent,
where doing so recognizes a developed adult-child relationship.").




316. Price provides some guidance as to when leaving a child in the custody of a third
party for an extended period of time is not conduct inconsistent with the parental right.
The court indicated that Howard's conduct would not be inconsistent with the parental
right if Howard and Price had agreed that Price's custody of the child was for a limited
period of time only, Howard's circumstances made such an arrangement necessary,
Howard maintained personal contact with the child, and Howard sought to resume
custody when she was able. See id. at 83-84, 484 S.E.2d at 537. It appears that the basis
for this result is not so much the blamelessness of the parent's conduct as the fact that
such conduct should not have led to the creation of a de facto parent-child relationship
between the custodian and the child. Presumably, if the temporary custody becomes
lengthy or of indefinite duration, the development of a de facto parent-child relationship




consideration of related aspects of the child's interest and welfare.
For example, Price cited with apparent approval several of the polar
star cases, in particular In re Custody of Hughes and In re Gibbons,311
and it summarized the rule that "some facts and circumstances,
typically those created by the parent, may warrant abrogation" of the
natural parent's custody interest. 18 Price also cited the portions of
Lehr v. Robertson and Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform that establish the "biology-plus" test providing
that the biological link alone does not create substantial
constitutional protection of a natural parent's right to contact with his
child.319 It also quoted a portion of Quilloin v. Walcott that suggests
the intact family exception (proposed by Judge Greene in Lambert v.
Riddick)30 as a limitation on the Petersen rule.32' As Price noted,
Quilloin upheld a state's procedure that allowed a stepfather to adopt
a child if such adoption was determined to be in the child's best
interest with no requirement that the natural father, who opposed the
adoption, be found unfit.31 Finally, Price quoted at length from a
1976 opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, Bennett v.
Jeffreys,3' for guidance as to the proper limitations on natural
parents' due process right to custody and control of their child's
adoption vis-a-vis third parties.324 Price appears to have accepted the
Bennett court's basic analysis that parental rights can be defeated by
"exceptions created by extraordinary circumstances." 31 In such
circumstances, the Bennett court reasoned, "the best interest of the
child has always been regarded as superior to the right of parental
custody.13 26 The Bennett court concluded that the case law "reveals a
shifting of emphasis rather than a remaking of substance" to reflect
that "[a] child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional
317. See id. at 75, 484 S.E.2d at 532.
318. Price, 346 N.C. at 75,484 S.E.2d at 532.
319. See id. at 77, 484 S.E.2d at 533 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261
(1983); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844
(1977)).
320. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Greene's
interpretation of Petersen in Lambert).
321. See id. at 78, 484 S.E.2d at 534 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978)).
322. See id. (citing Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255).
323. 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
324. See Price, 346 N.C. at 80-82, 484 S.E.2d at 535-36 (citing Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at
281-85).
325. Id. at 80-83, 484 S.E.2d at 535-36 (citing Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 281).
326. Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 281.
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magnitude. 327
Price thus appears to mark the swing of the legal pendulum from
Petersen back toward the polar star cases. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the conduct test stated in Price will accommodate
further movement toward the polar star cases, or if the details of the
Price analysis indicate the supreme court is inclined to expand the
conduct test in future cases where consideration of the child's welfare
appears to be unduly restricted.3'
The final issue implicated by the facts of Price-though not
specifically addressed in the opinion-is standing. The custody
action was brought by Stacy Price, the biologically unrelated but de
facto father.3 9 Because he was undeniably unrelated to the little girl,
he was an "other person ... claiming the right to custody" under
§ 50-13.1. 310 Petersen unequivocally stated that "G.S. § 50-13.1 was
not intended to confer upon strangers the right to bring custody or
visitation actions against parents of children unrelated to such
strangers. ' 33  Under Petersen, a de facto parent is nevertheless a
stranger if not biologically related to the child, and such a stranger
has no standing under § 50-13.1 to seek custody or visitation. Thus, it
is arguable that the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Price's claim for custody because he lacked standing to raise
the issue. But none of the courts that heard the matter dismissed
Price's action. The question remains whether Price overruled
Petersen on the standing issue or whether Price was subject to
dismissal upon remand to the trial court.332
327. Id.
328. Excluding Petersen, all the cases cited in Price are consistent with the polar star
cases. The cases indicate that a third party must cite exceptional or unusual
circumstances sufficient to show that the child's best interest requires custody in the third
party, and that these exceptional or unusual circumstances include the biological parent's
unfitness or unsuitability, other conduct by the biological parent that affected the welfare
of the child, and other attachments or relationships that affect the welfare of the child.
329. See Price, 346 N.C. at 71,484 S.E.2d at 529.
330. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(a) (1995).
331. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406,445 S.E.2d at 906.
332. "Standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction and as such, this Court may
raise the issue on its own motion." Sotelo v. Drew, 123 N.C. App. 464, 468, 473 S.E.2d
379, 381 (1996) (citing Union Grove Milling & Mfg. Co. v. Faw, 109 N.C. App. 248, 251,
426 S.E.2d 476,478, affd, 335 N.C. 165,436 S.E.2d 131 (1993)), aff'd per curiam, 345 N.C.
750, 483 S.E.2d 439 (1997). A proper party plaintiff is required to confer jurisdiction on a
court because a plaintiff with a personal stake in the outcome of the claim is necessary to
create the controversy and sharpen the issues. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties §§ 1, 19 & 30
(1987); see also Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 119-20, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180-81 (1993)
(holding that defendants had sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy to raise
a constitutional claim). Thus, standing is an element of subject matter jurisdiction, and
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As discussed above, it appears that Price modified Petersen's
definition of the due process right of natural parents to the custody
and control of their children. Such a revision of the constitutional
right, however, does not affect the Petersen ruling on standing
because that ruling was based on statutory interpretation of § 50-13.1
rather than on the statute's constitutionality.333 Even if a broader
reading of § 50-13.1 is now constitutional under Price, Petersen's
conclusion that the legislature did not intend § 50-13.1 to provide
standing to biological strangers to bring custody or visitation actions
against parents may still be controlling. Yet, it can also be argued
that Petersen's interpretation of § 50-13.1 is no longer controlling.
Price's failure to address the standing issue raised by Petersen may
indicate either that Petersen's statutory interpretation of § 50-13.1
was implicitly overruled by McIntyre v. McIntyre,334 or that Petersen's
statutory interpretation of § 50-13.1 may be binding as to visitation
actions but dictum as to custody actions.
In Petersen, the supreme court stated that § 50-13.1 was not
intended to allow biological strangers to sue for visitation or custody
because a contrary conclusion would render purposeless two other
statutes that dealt solely with grandparent visitation.335 While this
conclusion itself is questionable, 336 it is presumably the law until the
supreme court revisits the matter. After McIntyre, however, it may
be the law only as applied to visitation actions.
In McIntyre, grandparents filed a complaint against the natural
parents seeking visitation.337 The natural parents were married to
each other and lived together with their children. No custody action
was then pending.338 The parents moved to dismiss the visitation
action on the basis that either § 50-13.1(a) did not give grandparents
standing to bring the action for visitation or that, if it did give such
standing, § 50-13.1(a) was unconstitutional as applied. 39
parties cannot consent to or waive an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Waters
v. McBee, 244 N.C. 540, 547-48, 94 S.E.2d 640, 645 (1956); Hart v. Thomasville Motors,
244 N.C. 84, 88, 92 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1956); 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.15 n.10 (2d ed. 1984) (" 'Although raised by
neither of the parties, we are first obliged to examine the standing of appellees, as a
matter of the case-or-controversy requirement associated with Art. III.'" (quoting
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,331-32 (1977))).
333. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405-06, 445 S.E.2d at 905-06.
334. 341 N.C. 629,461 S.E.2d 745 (1995).
335. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405-06, 445 S.E.2d at 906.
336. See supra notes 199-205.
337. See McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 629, 461 S.E.2d at 746.
338. See id. at 629, 461 S.E.2d at 747.
339. See id. at 630, 461 S.E.2d at 747.
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The trial court held that § 50-13.1(a) was unconstitutional as
applied, but the supreme court resolved the matter through statutory
interpretation. 40 As in Oxendine v. Catawba County Department of
Social Services, 41 the McIntyre court acknowledged the broad grant
of standing inherent in the language of § 50-13.1(a), but noted that
subsequent, more specific statutes could limit the applicability of the
broad grant. 42  McIntyre expressly determined that § 50-13.2(bl),
§ 50-13.5(j), and § 50-13.2A were special statutes intended to provide
for "one aspect of a determination of legal custody, that of physical
custody, here in the form of visitation rights of grandparents," and
that these statutes pre-empted the general grant of standing to
relatives in § 50-13.1(a)? 43 Additionally, McIntyre held that the 1989
amendment to § 50-13.1(a) defining "custody" to include "custody or
visitation or both" was not meant to expand grandparent visitation
beyond what was expressly provided in § 50-13.2(bl), § 50-13.50),
and § 50-13.2A 4.3  This analysis is incompatible with the Petersen
conclusion that § 50-13.2(bl), § 50-13.50), and § 50-13.2A are
nullities if "other persons" as used in § 50-13.1(a) actually means
"other persons."'  Instead, as was the case for § 48-9.1(1) in
Oxendine, these statutes are intended as specific exceptions to the
general grant of standing provided in § 50-13.1.6
340. See iL at 629,634,461 S.E.2d at 747,749-50.
341. 303 N.C. 699,707,281 S.E.2d 370,375 (1981) (stating that when § 48-9.1 and § 50-
13.1 are construed together, "it is apparent that G.S. 50-13.1 was intended as a broad
statute, covering a myriad of situations in which custody disputes are involved, while G.S.
48-9.1 is a narrow statute, applicable only to custody of a minor child surrendered by its
natural parents pursuant to G.S. 48-9(a)(1)" and concluding that "G.S. 48-9.1(1) was
intended as an exception to the general grant of standing to contest custody set forth in
G.S. 50-13.1").
342. See McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 634-35, 461 S.E.2d at 749-50.
343. Id. at 632,461 S.E.2d at 748.
344. Id. at 634-35,461 S.E.2d at 747-48 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(a) (1995)).
345. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405-06, 445 S.E.2d at 906.
346. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. For an analogous example, see
Krauss v. Wayne County Department of Social Services, 347 N.C. 371, 493 S.E.2d 428,
(1997), in which a father whose parental rights had been terminated was found to lack
standing to bring a custody action as an "other person" pursuant to § 50-13.1(a) because
§ 7A-289.33 (the termination statute) was intended as an exception to the general grant of
standing set forth in § 50-13.1. See id. at 375-79, 493 S.E.2d at 431-33. The court in
Krauss expressly followed the rationale adopted in Oxendine-that § 7A-289.3 is, like
§ 48-9(a)(1), "narrowly drawn to address a specific custody situation and is therefore
intended to be an exception to the general grant of standing provided in N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.1(a)." Id. at 377, 493 S.E.2d at 432. Despite this express holding, Krauss affirms
Petersen's language that § 50-13.1 "'was not intended to confer upon strangers the right
to bring custody or visitation actions against parents of children unrelated to such
strangers [because] [s]uch a right would conflict with the constitutionally-protected
paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children.'" Id. at 379,
2196 [Vol. 76
THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY
McIntyre and Sharp v. Sharp34 7 also suggest that the Petersen
conclusion-that § 50-13.1 was not intended to give standing to
strangers bringing visitation or custody actions against biological
parents-is dictum with regard to standing to bring custody actions.
Traditionally, visitation has been viewed as "but a lesser degree of
custody."' 48  The court in McIntyre, however, found that the
legislature intended to treat grandparents' visitation actions
differently than custody actions, despite the 1989 amendment to § 50-
13.1(a).349 In Sharp, the maternal grandparents brought a custody
action under § 50-13.1 against the mother who had custody.350 The
mother argued that the McIntyre court held that § 50-13.1(a) did not
give grandparents standing to sue for visitation when no custody
proceeding was ongoing and the minor children's family was intact,
and that McIntyre applied to custody cases initiated by grandparents
as well. 351 The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.352
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
McIntyre was "narrowly limited to suits initiated by grandparents for
visitation and does not apply to suits for custody" involving
allegations that the parents were unfit.353  The court held that
although grandparents could "bring an initial suit for custody," the
grandparents still had to overcome the " 'constitutionally-protected
paramount right of parents to custody.' "I4 Thus, the court of
appeals held that because § 50-13.2(bl), § 50-13.50), and § 50-13.2A
addressed only visitation actions, § 50-13.1(a) was affected only as it
applied to visitation actions and not custody actions.3 5 Sharp's
493 S.E.2d at 433 (quoting Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906); see also Kelly v.
Blackwell, 121 N.C. App. 621, 622, 468 S.E.2d 400, 400-01, disc. review denied, 343 N.C.
123, 468 S.E.2d 782 (1996) (holding that a natural parent who has consented to the
adoption of his children lacks standing under § 50-13.1(a) to bring thereafter an action
against the natural parent and adoptive parent for custody or visitation of the children).
347. 124 N.C. App. 357,477 S.E.2d 258 (1996).
348. Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554,575-76,243 S.E.2d 129,142 (1978).
349. See McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 634-35, 461 S.E.2d at 749.
350. See Sharp, 124 N.C. App. at 357-61, 477 S.E.2d at 258-60.
351. See id. at 357, 477 S.E.2d at 260.
352. See id. at 358, 477 S.E.2d at 259.
353. Id. at 360, 477 S.E.2d at 260.
354. Id. at 361, 477 S.E.2d at 260 (quoting Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403-04, 445 S.E.2d at
905).
355. See id. at 360-61,363,477 S.E.2d 260-62; see also Fisher v. Gaydon, 124 N.C. App.
442, 444, 477 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1996) (holding that it followed from McIntyre that "under
the broad grant of section 50-13.1(a), grandparents have standing to seek visitation with
their grandchildren when those children are not living in a McIntyre 'intact family' ")
(note that this is the case name as it appears in the North Carolina Reporter; it is entitled
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conclusion is that the legislature intended for the standing provisions
of § 50-13.1 to apply differently depending on whether the cause of
action was for visitation or for custody.35 6 This conclusion, coupled
with the precise issue before the McIntyre court-whether, once
custody was returned to the natural parents, the grandparents had
standing to seek visitation under § 50-13.1-indicates that the
statement in Petersen that § 50-13.1 does not confer standing upon
strangers to bring a custody action against natural parents was
unnecessary to resolve the visitation issue before the court and,
therefore, dictum.
Perhaps Price's failure to address the standing issue for custody
actions as raised by Petersen is explained by a determination of the
supreme court that McIntyre implicitly overruled Petersen's statutory
interpretation of § 50-13.1. Another possibility is that the conclusion
in Petersen concerning standing created by § 50-13.1 was dictum as
applied to custody actions. Either way, trial courts apparently are
free to interpret § 50-13.1 to confer standing to non-related third
parties to bring custody actions against parents. At this point,
however, both Petersen and McIntyre suggest that such a statutory
grant of standing would violate the natural parent's paramount right
to custody and control. 7 Although this suggestion may have been
true for the paramount right as defined by Petersen, the relaxed
paramount interest as defined by Price is more accommodating.
If § 50-13.1 is interpreted to confer standing on any unrelated
third party to bring a custody action against a natural parent,38 a trial
court will nevertheless lack subject matter jurisdiction to proceed
unless the complaint alleges facts sufficient to overcome the natural
parent's paramount right to custody. 9 Under Petersen, such facts
Fisher v. Fisher in the South Eastern Reporter) disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 640, 483
S.E.2d 706 (1997).
356. See Sharp, 124 N.C. App. at 360,477 S.E.2d at 260.
357. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406,445 S.E.2d at 906; McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 634-35, 461
S.E.2d at 749-50.
358. Under this broad interpretation of § 50-13.1, biological strangers to the child
would have standing to bring custody actions, but they would be unlikely to prevail on the
merits of the action without a strong factual connection to the child which is directly
relevant to the child's interests and welfare. They also might have difficulty making the
initial showing of the natural parent's inconsistent conduct.
359. The court in McIntyre held that under § 50-13.1(a) a trial court has jurisdiction in
custody matters when the paramount right of parents can be overcome by unfitness,
abandonment, neglect, or death. See McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 632, 461 S.E.2d at 748 (citing
Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 706, 281 S.E.2d 370, 374
(1981)); see also Sharp, 124 N.C. App. at 363, 477 S.E.2d at 261-62 (stating that because
the grandparents claimed unfitness on the part of the parents, the district court had
jurisdiction to hold a hearing).
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had to relate to the natural parent's unfitness or neglect. Under
Price, however, the facts sufficient to overcome the paramount right
must relate to the parent's conduct and should include allegations
concerning the child's interest and welfare insofar as the parent's
conduct contributed to these matters.36 ° As discussed earlier, a third-
party plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction under Price if he alleges that he has had custody of the
child for a significant period of time, that he is a de facto or
psychological parent, that his special relationship with the child was
caused by conduct of the natural parent that was inconsistent with
her paramount interest in custody, and that the best interest of the
child requires custody by the third party.3 61 Such an interpretation of
§ 50-13.1 would appear under Price to protect adequately the due
process interest of the natural parent and would be constitutional-
even when applied to situations in which the defendants are natural
parents in an intact family. Otherwise, the matter would not proceed
unless the plaintiff could make sufficient allegations of inconsistent
conduct by the parents. 62
VI. THIRD-PARTY PROCEEDINGS AFTER PRIcE
Consider the following hypothetical custody action filed
subsequent to Price. The plaintiff, Alice, filed a custody action
against Gertrude for the custody of the minor child, Scott. The
complaint alleges that Scott was born in June 1989 to the unmarried
360. See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 282-358 and accompanying text.
362. This approach should also satisfy the general prudential concern that standing
requires a party to have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding (i.e., a third
party ought not to have standing to initiate a custody proceeding if the third party has no
conceivable claim for custody). See supra note 332; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1)
& (5)(a) (1997) (granting standing to seek custody or visitation to anyone, related or not,
"who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship"; defining a child-
parent relationship as one that meets "the child's psychological needs for a parent," in
addition to meeting physical needs; establishing minimum time requirements; and
establishing that the person must have physical custody of the child or live in the same
household); In re Marriage of Sorensen, 906 P.2d 838, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (stating
that even where the child is in the custody of two fit biological parents, a third party may
allege that he or she "has established a psychological 'child-parent relationship' "); Bryce
Levine, Note, Divorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco Parentis Stepparents
Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution Proceeding, 25
HOFSTRA L. REv. 315 (1996) (arguing that stepparents found to be in loco parentis with
their stepchildren should have the right to petition the court for custody during a
dissolution proceeding); cf UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACt § 401(d)(2), 9A
U.L.A. 147, 550 (1987) (providing that if the biological parents have physical custody of
the child, a non-parent lacks standing to seek custody of the child).
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Gertrude and an unknown father. In early 1990, Alice and Gertrude
met and became friends. At that time, Alice had custody of Ernest,
her two-year-old child from a previous marriage.
In June 1990, Gertrude and Scott moved in with Alice and
Ernest. Alice, Gertrude, Ernest, and Scott lived together as a family
in Morganton until June 1995, when Gertrude moved to Charlotte to
accept a particularly lucrative job offer and to be closer to her ailing
parents. Alice and Gertrude agreed that the children would stay with
Alice in Morganton for the 1995-96 school year and stay with
Gertrude during the summer of 1996. Because the health problems
of Gertrude's parents required her time and attention, the children
did not spend that summer with Gertrude but remained with Alice
for the summer and for the following school year. Gertrude told
Alice that she wanted the children to stay with her for the summer of
1997 but that her travel schedule for work would not allow it. The
children remained with Alice and began school in the fall of 1997.
After visiting with the family in Morganton during Thanksgiving,
1997, Gertrude returned to Charlotte with eight-year-old Scott
against the wishes of Alice. Gertrude enrolled Scott in school in
Charlotte, and Alice filed a custody action. Alice admits that
Gertrude is fit to have custody, but that her job requires extensive
travel and that Scott will be left in the care of a babysitter for long
periods of time. Alice also alleges that it is in Scott's best interest to
remain in the de facto family unit which exists in Alice's home. Alice
alleges that Gertrude's conduct is inconsistent with her interest in the
care and custody of Scott and that such conduct created the de facto
family within which Scott's best interest requires that he stay.
A. Standing
Should the trial judge grant Gertrude's motion to dismiss Alice's
custody action based upon Alice's lack of standing as a biological
stranger? The trial judge should deny Gertrude's motion to dismiss.
The contrary language in Petersen63 is dictum and in any event was
implicitly discredited by McIntrye3 4 and Price.3 65 As in Price,366 Alice
363. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406,445 S.E.2d at 906.
364. See McIntyre, 341 N.C. at 634-35, 461 S.E.2d at 749-50; supra notes 335-46 and
accompanying text.
365. See Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 82-84, 484 S.E.2d at 535-57; supra notes 299-332 and
accompanying text.
366. In Price, the plaintiff was the psychological father because he was an equal
caretaker-and at times, the primary caretaker-of the child since birth, both he and the
child thought he was her father, and the child's mother represented that he was the father.
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is a psychological parent whose special relationship with the child was
created by the allegedly inconsistent conduct of the defendant
mother. If Alice lacks standing to bring this custody action, there is
no one to bring the action that Price expressly allows. Price implicitly
holds that § 50-13.1 does not exclude all biological strangers from its
grant of standing to bring custody actions. 67
B. Conduct Inconsistent with the Personal Interest
Should the trial judge grant Gertrude's motion to dismiss Alice's
custody action based on Alice's failure to demonstrate conduct
inconsistent with Gertrude's paramount interest in the custody and
See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text. The mother's conduct in representing that
the plaintiff was the father and allowing the plaintiff to have primary custody even when
she moved to another city created the special relationship between the plaintiff and the
child. See supra notes 281-98 and accompanying text.
367. See Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 82-84, 484 8.E.2d at 535-57. In an opinion filed as this
article was going to print, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that "a relationship
in the nature of a parent and child relationship, even in the absence of a biological
relationship, will suffice to support a finding of standing" under § 50-13.1. See Ellison v.
Ramos, 1998 WL 436057, No. COA97-1417, at *4 (N.C. App. Aug. 4, 1998). In Ellison,
the plaintiff sought custody of the minor child of Ramos, the biological father. The
plaintiff, who was not the biological mother, alleged that she and Ramos had never
married, but that they were" 'intimate companions' "for five years, and that during these
five years, the plaintiff had "'mothered the child.'" Id. at *1. The child's biological
mother had been in a comatose and vegetative state since the child's birth. See id. The
plaintiff alleged that after the parties separated, the child lived with the plaintiff until
Ramos removed her from the plaintiff's home and took the child to Puerto Rico to live
with her grandparents. See id. The plaintiff also alleged that the child was a Type I
diabetic who was not receiving proper care, whose grandparents did not know how to
provide the appropriate care for a diabetic child, and who had to be "hospitalized in
Puerto Rico as a result of not receiving proper care." Id. The trial court dismissed the
complaint as a matter of law, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to proceed under
the holdings in Petersen and Price. See id. at *2. The court of appeals reversed the trial
court, holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged "a relationship in the nature of a
parent-child relationship" to give her standing to bring the action. See id. at *4. The
court noted that some lesser relationship also may suffice to give a third party standing as
an "other person" under § 50-13.1(a) to seek custody, but it declined to answer that
question "given the relative newness of the application of the standing doctrine in this
area ... [and the] potentially vast number of unexplored fact patterns which could
underlie such cases." Id.
Although the Ellison standard presents a workable and arguably constitutional test,
see supra notes 358-63, its analysis is superficial. The court in Ellison based its holding in
part on its conclusion that Petersen used the term "stranger" to mean a social stranger,
when it is clear that the Petersens were strangers to the child only in the biological sense.
See Ellison, 1998 WL 436057, at *4. The Ellison court also asserted that the absence of
discussion of the standing issue in Price "would... indicate that if the issue had come up
the relationship would have been sufficient to support standing." Id. Matters of subject
matter jurisdiction, like standing, can be raised at any time, however, and are not waived
or held to be resolved conclusively simply because a court proceeded as if it had subject
matter jurisdiction.
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control of Scott? As in Price,36 Gertrude's conduct created, or at
least allowed, the psychological familial relationships that developed
between Scott, Alice, and Ernest. The courts apparently will
presume the strength or significance of these relationships from the
length of time that the de facto family has existed.3 69 Such allegations
should be sufficient under Price to give the court subject matter
jurisdiction and to entitle Alice to a hearing.
C. Evidence of Parental Conduct/Bifurcation
Assuming the custody action survives the motion to dismiss, how
should the judge consider the evidence that may be presented on
standing and on issues involving the conduct of the parent and the
best interest of the child? The issues are whether the trial judge
should bifurcate the hearing or simply hear all evidence at once. If
the court hears all the evidence together, including evidence related
to the child's interest and welfare, then the court would, in sequential
order, determine Alice's standing, the court's subject matter
jurisdiction, whether the mother's conduct was inconsistent with her
parental paramount interest, and the best interest of the child.
Although the trial court must bear in mind each stage in the
process, it is not expected that district judges will bifurcate the
hearing or that the appellate courts will require such bifurcation.
Evidence of the de facto parent-child relationship is relevant and,
indeed, is probably required to establish standing, subject matter
jurisdiction, and ultimately the best interest of the child. Judicial
economy would be poorly served by hearing similar, if not identical,
evidence in three separate stages. If the pleading contains the proper
allegations, a full best interest hearing seems almost inevitable, but
the trial court will need to take special care in drafting its judgment
to resolve each stage properly and in the proper order. This practice,
bifurcating the decisionmaking process but not the hearing, is already
the standard procedure in termination of parental rights
proceedings.370
368. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text (discussing Price).
370. In In re White, 81 N.C. App. 82, 344 S.E.2d 36 (1986), the court of appeals held
that although the courts are required to apply different evidentiary standards at each of
the two stages of adjudication and disposition in a termination of parental rights
proceeding, there is no requirement that the courts conduct the stages at separate
hearings. See id. at 85, 344 S.E.2d at 38. The court stated that because proceedings
regarding parental rights are decided by a judge, the judge should "consider the evidence
in light of the applicable legal standard and ... determine whether grounds for
termination exist before proceeding to consider evidence relevant only to the
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D. Best Interest Test Under the Polar Star Cases
Under the polar star line of cases, would the North Carolina
Supreme Court uphold the trial court's conclusion that the best
interest of Scott required that he return to the custody of Alice? It is
arguable that these facts would permit but not compel a trial court to
conclude that the best interest of Scott required that he be in Alice's
custody. The polar star cases have few absolute rules, but In re
Custody of Hughes371 and In re Gibbons372 appear to provide support.
E. Price Analysis
Under Price, would the North Carolina Supreme Court uphold
the trial court's conclusion that Gertrude's conduct was sufficient to
waive her paramount right to custody and that Scott's best interest
would be served by returning him to Alice's custody? Much would
depend on the precise evidence produced at the hearing. Such
evidence could include more details on why Gertrude moved to
Charlotte, what kind of relationship Gertrude maintained with Scott
after she moved out of the family home, the strength of Scott's
attachment to Alice and Ernest, and the precise understanding of
Gertrude and Alice as to the care and custody of Scott. Price seems
to indicate that it is the result of Gertrude's conduct and not the
motivation for such conduct that is significant.3 73 In other words,
Gertrude's conduct is inconsistent if it created the de facto family
regardless of whether her conduct was motivated by irresponsibility
or by the very best of motives, such as caring for ill parents and
providing more for her family by pursuing a better job. The trial
court appears to be left with significant discretion to evaluate
parental conduct and motivation; however, as in the polar star cases,
the appellate court may decide in certain cases that the trial court
made the wrong decision. The best interest test is notorious for the
vast reservoir of unbridled discretion it bestows on the trial court,
often to the discomfort of the appellate bench.3 74
dispositional stage." Id.
371. 254 N.C. 434, 119 S.E.2d 189 (1961); see supra notes 64-72 and accompanying
text.
372. 247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957); see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
373. See Price, 346 N.C. at 83,484 S.E.2d at 537.
374. Our legal system is sometimes viewed as inherently ill-suited to address and
resolve certain custody matters. The legal system's focus on appellate review of trial
court proceedings to determine the correct procedures and the correct test or
considerations to be applied may result in good law but can also ignore the child's sense
of time and basic need for continuity of relationships and surroundings. See Resnik, supra
note 168, at 364 (noting that the legal system is "woefully inadequate to handle the
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Finally, Price's focus on the subjective agreement between the
parties as to the length or temporary nature of the custody with the
de facto parent375 is an important variable whose significance remains
to be discerned. Will a specific agreement for less than a certain
amount of time absolutely protect a natural parent's custodial
interest, or will it simply be a factor to be balanced along with the
other circumstances? Will such a rule only apply for custodial
agreements of six months or less? It is expected that the trial courts'
exercise of reasonable discretion will be upheld so long as the focus
remains on the conduct of the parent inconsistent with parental
responsibilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
In custody disputes between natural parents and unrelated third
parties, applying a pure best interest test 376 and conferring standing
on everyone may not be good policy and probably violates the
constitution as applied to some cases. But the General Assembly
properly determines policy and arguably has not placed any limits on
the standing of unrelated third parties to bring custody or visitation
actions, and it has decreed that a pure best interest test will apply.3 7
If these statutes are unconstitutional as applied in certain situations,
it is the judiciary's job to so determine. The appellate courts,
contentious issue of unwed fathers' rights with the requisite rapidity to avoid endangering
the children around whom the controversies centered").
375. See Price, 346 N.C. at 83,484 S.E.2d at 537.
376. Appellate judges may be uncomfortable with their role of reviewing best interest
decisions only under the abuse of discretion standard. The courts-both trial and
appellate-are more comfortable applying clear rules and presumptions, and the true best
interest test, with its lack of clear limits on the judge's exercise of discretion, can indeed
appear as the kind of social engineering that judges traditionally loathe. See supra note 4
(discussing social engineering and the Baby Jessica case). Commentators critical of the
best interest test point out that the standard allows "a disturbing erosion of critical due
process protections that serve the interests of both parents and children" and that "[t]he
lack of a uniform understanding of the term 'best interests' " and the resulting uncertainty
"raise[ ] significant concerns about 'social engineering.'" Annette R. Appell & Bruce A.
Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of
Adoption, 2 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 66 (1995). They also conclude that
these ambiguities will most affect the "families whose racial and economic status already
place them at great risk of destructive state intervention." Id. Most significantly, they
say, the best interest standard does not protect children from "the conflicting interests of
unrelated adults," but that "it simply serves in practice to shift responsibility for making
decisions about children among adults." Id.; see also Elizabeth P. Miller, Note, DeBoer v.
Schmidt and Twigg v. Mays: Does the "Best Interests of the Child" Standard Protect the
Best Interests of Children?, 20 J. CoNTEMP. L. 497, 504, 509 (1994) (noting the confusion
and inconsistency caused by the vagueness of the best interest standard).
377. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (Supp. 1997).
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however, are properly bound by the need to interpret any common
law rights in light of subsequent legislation, to interpret legislation in
light of the clear language chosen by the legislature, and to address
constitutional conflicts when necessary. Shortcutting or confusing
this process can result in some unintended yet heartrending
consequences that can be difficult to remedy or even address if the
analysis is disjointed or illogical.
For example, if unrelated third parties never have standing to
bring custody actions, then otherwise valid custody actions under the
Price standard may remain unfiled for lack of anyone to bring the
action. In addition, if a natural parent is always entitled to custody if
fit, then the powerful emotional ties present in a de facto family,
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court as legitimate
factors in due process issues,378 count for nothing. Such dogmatic
rules are too simple and absolute and are not compelled by the
common law, the North Carolina General Statutes, or the United
States Constitution. Psychological parents and de facto families exist.
It is not good policy-and it is not the policy of North Carolina-to
ignore these established but non-biological relationships. North
Carolina law must provide for consideration and protection of these
de facto relationships.
Price's modification of the Petersen rules may or may not prove
sufficient. Price allows consideration, albeit indirect, of the existence
of these de facto relationships, although the focus is exclusively on
the natural parent's conduct rather than the interests of the de facto
parent and the child. This focus may, in some cases, unduly limit
consideration of the de facto relationship. Whether Price is
sufficiently flexible will be determined by how it is applied by the
trial courts and interpreted by the appellate courts. It will also be
critical, of course, if Price is viewed as implicitly overruling the
Petersen language regarding standing of unrelated third parties under
§ 50-13.1. Again, the trial courts will need to address this issue long
before the appellate courts resolve the matter. Given the uncertainty
but clear importance of the standing issue, it might be advisable for
the General Assembly to consider enacting a new standing statute,
perhaps along the lines of other states' statutes that expressly give
standing to defined psychological parents379 or that give standing to
any person who has had custody of the child for a continuous six-
378. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816,836,844 (1977).
379. See supra note 362 (discussing Oregon statute).
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month period.5 0
In addition to these matters left unclear by Price and Petersen,
North Carolina attorneys should consider approaches that were not
attempted in Price and Petersen but nevertheless appear viable. For
example, equitable principles appear applicable to third-party
custody disputes and might be applied to estop a natural parent from
denying standing, denying the de facto relationship,"' or asserting a
paramount right to custody.381 Equitable parenthood may be a legal
380. Texas statutes provide that an original suit may be filed by "a person who has had
actual care, control and possession of the child for not less than six months preceding the
filing of the petition." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(9) (West 1996).
381. For example, in Mayer v. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659 (1984), a suit
between a husband and wife, the husband was equitably estopped from challenging the
validity of an admittedly invalid foreign divorce. See id. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668. The
court acknowledged that by estopping the husband from questioning the divorce's
validity, it was, in effect "validating a marriage which G.S. § 51-3 declares a nullity." Id.
at 536, 311 S.E.2d at 668. But, the court explained that "[t]here is a difference ...
between declaring a marriage valid and preventing one from asserting its invalidity." Id.
The theory of equitable estoppel, the court stated, is not to invalidate a legal divorce or to
validate an invalid marriage, "but rather, to prevent one from disrupting family relations
by allowing one to avoid obligations as a spouse." Id. Whether equitable estoppel should
apply depends on events surrounding the divorce and is a question of the "personal
disability of the party attacking the divorce judgment; it is not a function of the divorce
decree itself." Id. (citing Homer Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees
of Divorce, 70 YALE L.J. 45, 47 (1960)). See also Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C. App. 643, 645,
448 S.E.2d 862, 863-64 (1994) (declaring that the plaintiff had waived his right to
challenge the judges' actions on the ground of subject matter jurisdiction because he had
failed to raise the challenge in earlier appeals and had accepted the benefits of those
judgments).
382. Constitutional rights generally and due process rights specifically can be waived.
See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (discussing waiver of
constitutional rights in civil and criminal contexts). Compare In re Baby Girl Dockery,
495 S.E.2d 417 (1998), in which the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that an
unmarried father's right to custody of his child was constitutionally denied pursuant to the
provisions of former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6(a) (1984) because of the father's failure to
acknowledge paternity, to legitimate the child, or to provide substantial financial support
or consistent care to the child prior to the filing of the adoption petition. See id. at 419-20.
The court's holding was made despite facts that showed that the father had no knowledge
that the mother-whom he had dated only briefly-had become pregnant; that upon
learning of the birth, and within six weeks of the child's birth, the father filed an action
seeking to establish his paternity of the child and requesting custody; and that upon
learning that an adoption petition had been filed one week earlier, the father moved to
intervene in the adoption proceeding. See id. at 418-19. The Dockery court did not
address the paramount right to custody discussed in Petersen and Price, but instead cited
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), for the proposition that although the link
between a parent and a child is a fundamental right worthy of the highest degree of
scrutiny, the mere biological link alone-without an actual relationship with the child-
does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. See Dockery, 495 S.E.2d at 419-21.
The unexamined but crucial issues in Dockery are whether an unwed biological father
must be allowed some meaningful opportunity or time-period within which to establish an
THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY
concept worth exploring in North Carolina.
A second approach is based on the proposition that the due
process right of privacy protects not only the natural parent but also
the child and the de facto family. United States Supreme Court
opinions are not inconsistent with finding constitutional protection of
established de facto family relationships. 3 Thus, the powerful
constitutional right of a natural parent to custody of her child would
control if the natural family was intact. The parent's constitutional
rights, however, would be subject to the constitutional rights of the
child and psychological parent if the natural family was not intact and
if a de facto family had been created.
Custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party will
always be among the most difficult matters heard by district court
judges. For the most part, intact families should not be subjected to
defending their familial life in court simply upon a third party's
allegation that different custodial or visitation decisions would be in
the child's best interest. Absent more specific and more serious
allegations, it seems reasonable that continued custody in the intact
natural family is in the child's best interest.
When a third party has had custody of the child for a significant
time and a significant de facto parent-child relationship has allegedly
developed, there must be some doubt as to where the best interest of
that child lies. Price may well be interpreted to allow an award of
custody to de facto parents, but if it is not, other unexplored legal
theories may allow what Price would not. In any event, in such cases
it would not appear to offend due process if the best interest of the
child once more became the polar star to guide the judge otherwise
adrift on custody seas under a lowering sky.
actual relationship with the child, whether the father's failure to establish this relationship
waives whatever constitutional right he had to establish a relationship, and, on the facts of
the case, whether the father waived his right to establish the relationship when, although
he initially was not informed of the pregnancy or birth, he nevertheless filed an action for
custody of the child within six weeks of her birth.
A result similar to Dockery might be required in Utah, where state statutes provide
that "[a]n unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a
sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an
adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur, and has a duty to protect his own
rights and interests." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.13(1) (1996 & Supp. 1997).
383. See supra notes 161-79, 311 and accompanying text (discussing United States
Supreme Court cases that support protection of established de facto families).
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